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Introduction
Since the attacks of September 11th, 2001, when hijackers piloted American
passenger planes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, terrorism has become the
largest security concern of the United States. Also, religious terrorist groups are distinct in
that they launch much more violent and costly attacks than other kinds of terrorists,
leading to nation states making combating terrorism a much higher national security
priority. The hijackers from 9/11 were mostly from Saudi Arabia, along with a few from
other Arab states, who were all members of the terrorist organization al Qaeda, led by
Osama Bin Laden. Al Qaeda attacked the United States because it viewed U.S. foreign policy
in the Middle East as destructive to Muslims and wanted to get rid of foreign influence in
Muslim countries. Osama Bin Laden described al Qaeda’s religious reasoning for attacking
the U.S stating:
“We have declared jihad against the US, because in our religion it is our duty
to make jihad so that God's word is the one exalted to the heights and so that
we drive the Americans away from all Muslim countries”1.
The attacks on 9/11 led to President George W. Bush’s declaration of the
commencement of The War on Terror in which he stated, “Our ‘War on Terror’ begins with
al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach
has been found, stopped, and defeated.2" George W. Bush believed that the only way to
combat terrorism was to destroy all terrorist organizations, starting with al-Qaeda and
continuing on to other groups throughout the world. President Bush’s speech about the
Laden to Frontline newsgroup, "Osama bin Laden V. The U.S: Edicts and Statements."
Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People: Hearings Before the American
People, 2001 President (D.C. 2001) (statement of George W. Bush). Accessed May 1, 2017.
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.
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events of 9/11 and the War on Terror rallied U.S public opinion in support of the war. The
War on Terror led the United States to invade both Afghanistan and Iraq. After fifteen
years, U.S troops are still battling terrorists in Afghanistan, and despite the U.S. withdrawal
of conventional soldiers from Iraq, the state is still in major turmoil due to terrorist
organizations. The U.S., along with its allies, has failed to destroy al-Qaeda and global
terrorism through military means, and now the terrorist group The Islamic State is
operating in Iraq and Syria.
While the United States continues to prosecute the war on terrorism, history
suggests most terrorist groups will eventually collapse on their own without states’
counter terrorism measures. The majority of terrorist groups struggle to survive and
eventually collapse within several years. It has been estimated that around 70% of modern
terrorist groups do not continue to exist past one year from their first attack, and 80% do
not exist five years after their first attack.3 However, there is a reason to expect that
religiously motivated terrorist organizations are capable of having a much longer life span
compared to other forms of terrorism.
For example, consider the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The IRA formed in 1917 and
has, until recently, continued to operate and launch attacks. The IRA, originally formed to
end the British rule of Ireland, later fought to unify Northern Ireland with the independent
Republic of Ireland after Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland were split. Danny
Morrison, a former IRA member, explains why the IRA resorted to violence for Irish
independence stating, “The main struggle, the main thrust- and this goes without saying- is
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the armed struggle, because that’s the only way to get the Brits out of Ireland”4. The IRA
has survived longer than other anticolonial terrorist group and even any other modern
terrorist group5. In addition, the IRA was also a religious organization. Despite the IRA
having nonreligious goals, it was by no means a secular organization. The IRA was not a
secular organization because it was deeply connected to Catholicism due to the sectarian
divide between Irish and English Protestants vs. Irish Catholics. These observations raise
important questions: why do religious terrorist organizations6 last longer than other kinds
of terrorist groups? And what consequences does this have for U.S foreign policy?
I contend that religion changes the recruitment strategies of terrorist organizations,
enabling them to continue to recruit new members because the religious ideology of the
organization can draw them in. Religion allows terrorists to recruit new members not just
for political reasons but for religious reasons as well. The very nature of religious terrorist
groups helps draw in additional recruits, because joining the groups seems more
imperative and morally justified because they are fighting for their religious beliefs and
their God or God’s. Religion also attracts new members because terrorist organizations can
frame political issues and counterterrorism measures as an attack on their religion, which
makes people believe they must join in order to defend their religious beliefs. Many of
these groups that are recognized as religion-based organizations are hardly that at all, but
the religious aspects are highlighted in order to gain sympathy and inspire new

Shanahan, Provisional Irish, [Page 45].
Rapoport, Attacking Terrorism, [Page 48].
6 To be clear, when I use the term religious terrorist organization, I do not mean to suggest that
terrorism grows out of any specific religion. This is a particularly important point given the current
politicization of Islamic terrorism in the United States national security discourse. Thus when I use
the terms Islamic terrorist organization or Islamic terrorist. I am referring to their self-described
religious motivation, and not making a judgment to the legitimacy of those claims.
4
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membership. In predicting the longevity of a terrorist group, it is essential to look at their
recruitment strategies and their recruitment successes. Many religious terrorist groups
have excelled in continuously recruiting newer members, and because of this it appears
they will continue to exist as long as their recruitment strategies are not interrupted.
In this paper, I will first review why recruitment is vital for terrorist groups, because
successful recruitment leads to the longevity of these organizations especially because it is
difficult for terrorist groups to survive. From there I am going to write about my case study
of the IRA and how religion was important for IRA recruitment. Successful recruiting based
on religious beliefs allowed the IRA to become the longest lasting modern terrorist
organization. In the following section, I am going to write about two currently operating
Islamic terrorists groups, al Qaeda and ISIS, who despite using varying methods of
recruitment, still both utilize religion to gain members. Finally, I consider the implications
of this argument for current U.S. counterterrorism policy.

5

Why Recruitment is Important for Longevity
The reason why certain terrorist groups survive longer than others is due to their
ability to continuously appeal to individuals to join their organization. Constant
recruitment is necessary for terrorist organizations because it provides these groups with
the manpower and resources needed to continue their campaign. Brian Phillips describes
why terrorist organizations are dependent on recruitment for survival writing,
“Groups want sympathetic individuals to join them in the struggle, but costs
to the individuals—prison or death, for example—can be high. To survive,
terrorist groups need to have attributes that give them advantages in
mobilization. Mobilization refers to the process of a group maintaining its
resources (members, money, etc.) and getting new resources.”7
As previously mentioned, 80% of modern terrorist organizations do not continue to
operate for more than five years after their first attack, as seen in the graph below8. The
majority of groups that do not survive past the five-year mark do so because of their
inability to recruit new members and maintain enough members for the organization to
function. Terrorist groups with greater membership are more durable and can continue to
operate longer because they have more resources through their members, therefore
making it much more difficult for governments to break them apart9. Lack of constant
recruitment is what leads to the demise of most terrorist organizations.

Phillips, "Terrorist Group," [Page 337].
Young and Dugan, "Survival of the Fittest,"
9 Jones and Libicki, "How Terrorist," [Page 17].
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Figure 1. Kaplan-Meier function for 2,223 terrorist organizations, 1970-2010 10

Terrorist groups also acknowledge the strength of their membership as well as the
importance of recruitment as being vital to their survivability. This can explain why
terrorist organizations are constantly competing with one another for members. Terrorist
groups have to capture the interest of recruits in order for the recruits to join their
organization and not another. In doing so they advertise their brand of terrorism as if they
were a company advertising a product. When a terrorist group successfully creates an
ideology and follows certain practices that are popular among possible recruits, then it can
succeed in gaining more members giving the group the longevity it desires. Groups that are
unable to compete with other groups for membership are much more likely to fade away.
The necessity for recruits and competition among terrorist groups becomes even more
10
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evident when you look at how the number of terrorist attacks and the number of groups
currently operating within one region correlate, which is due to these terrorist groups
launching attacks in order to gain notoriety and members11. In the graph below, one can
see how the number of competing terrorist groups led to the increase in terrorist attacks,
which were in large part executed by each group in order to draw in new members to their
organizations.

Figure 2. Number of Terror Attacks and Groups from 1970 to 2010, Global Terrorism
Database12

Recruitment is essential to terrorist organizations if they are to survive and have a
chance at succeeding or achieving some of their political goals. However, even for the 20%
of terrorists groups that manage to successfully recruit enough members to survive for five
years, they do not usually exist longer than one generation. The reason why terrorist

11
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organizations only last about one generation at most is because of their inability to
successfully continue their recruitment strategies beyond one generation. As hard as it is
for terrorist groups to recruit enough members to begin their organization, it becomes
even more troublesome when it comes to recruiting a newer, younger generation. Once a
group becomes older, it becomes much harder for members to appeal to younger
generations who are more likely to be out of touch with the group’s cause. The younger
generation of potential recruits may relate more to a new cause and be drawn to different
ideas proposed by a newer terrorist group’s ideology.
This pattern is consistent with the wave theory of terrorism, which purports to
explain why each “breed” of terrorist group has lasted about one generation. David
Rapoport describes how forms of terrorism have gradually disappeared writing, “ When a
waves energy cannot inspire new organizations, the wave disappears. Resistance, political
concessions, and change in perceptions of generations are critical factors in explaining the
disappearance”13. As terrorist groups become older, it becomes much more difficult to gain
new membership from younger generations because they do no share the same views or
values as the original members of the organization. Once a terrorist organization is unable
to appeal to younger recruits, the terrorist group eventually dies out along with its aging
members. Currently, the most common form of terrorism is religious terrorism, which
started to become popular in the 1970s. Religious terrorism has now existed for 46 years,
thus, according to the David Rapoport’s wave theory; the United States should expect alQaeda, its affiliates, and other religious terrorist groups to persist for about ten more years
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until a generational shift in ideas makes it impossible for existing religious terrorists
groups to successfully recruit new members. According to the wave theory, younger
generations will be disinterested with the ideas of religious terrorism and will join newer
“breeds” of terrorism creating a new wave of modern terrorism.
Due to religious terrorist groups uniqueness in their use of religiosity to mobilize
more members to fight, they can survive for much longer than other kinds of groups.
Generational shifts in political views of younger members have led to the demise of many
terrorist groups, but many believe that these organizations may survive because of the
“staying power of sacred or spiritually based motivation”14 which helps attract new
members from younger generations. Scholars use the Irish Republican Army (IRA) as a
prime example of how to gain new members by using religion as a motivating factor.

14
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Case Study of the IRA
The Irish Republican Army provides a valuable case study for evaluating the
longevity of terrorist organizations because of the IRA’s uniqueness in existing for such an
extended period of time. The Irish Republican Army was formed in the early 1900’s as a
nationalist group that fought for Irish independence from England. So you may wonder,
how does the nationalist IRA relate to today’s religious terrorist groups? Despite the
conflict in Ireland revolving around Irish independence, religion played a major role in the
conflict. The IRA’s fight for Irish independence developed into a fight between Catholics
and Protestants. In the following chapter, I describe many important moments that
occurred in the IRA’s history and how religion played a pivotal role. Religion affected
recruiting and is the reason why the IRA existed for such a long stretch of time in
comparison to most other terrorist groups.
Background:
Before the IRA became organized, it was inevitable that a religious conflict would
occur as a result of the political environment in Ireland. Prior to the formation of the IRA,
there was already a major division in Ireland between Catholics and Protestants. Ireland
was predominantly Irish Catholic, but Protestants made up a majority of Ireland’s six
northern counties, while Catholics held a majority population in the remaining twenty-six
counties. However, because Ireland was part of the United Kingdom, Irish Catholics were
treated as British citizens. Unlike Ireland, Britain’s population had a Protestant majority,
which led to Irish Protestants being treated much better than Irish Catholics. Religious,
economic, and land ownership issues in Ireland led to the Irish Home Rule Movement in the
1870’s which was a push for the development of an Irish parliament that would rule over
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domestic issues in Ireland. The Irish Home Rule Movement started to gain more
momentum once Irish Protestants began to agree that union with Great Britain was
becoming more problematic, and Britain’s government did not have the capability of fixing
many of Ireland’s problems. Isaac Butt, who developed the first Home Rule Act, made it
clear that if the Protestants supported the home rule movement, then they would gain
support from the Catholic majority who he and many others believed would spiral into
rebellion if an Irish Parliament was not developed15. Unionists did not want to separate
from Britain, but they accepted that the Irish Catholics would likely rise up if something
was not done to give Ireland more independence.
It wasn’t until 1914 that the Third Irish Home Bill passed in England and was
expected to go into effect after one year or until the end of WWI. Irish Catholics, who
largely favored the bill, were anticipating having self-governance, which would give them
more power and make their own culture more prominent16. The development of the Home
Rule Bill was met with severe resistance from unionists. Unionists formed the Ulster
Volunteer Force (UVF) that promised to use military force in order to protect unionist
politics. Witnessing unionists bearing arms in opposition to the Home Rule Act, nationalists
responded with a similar gesture in the Home Rule’s defense. “Thus in November 1913 in
Dublin the Irish Volunteers established, a militia whose Irish title was to be that of the IRA
into which the volunteers later evolved”17. Due to the formation of armed unionists,
nationalists responded by developing their own militia, which would later develop into the
well-known IRA .The religious divide became more apparent among Protestants and

McCaffery, "Isaac Butt," [Page 78].
English, Armed Struggle, [Page 10].
17 English, Armed Struggle, [Page 10].
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Catholics because of politics with Protestants resisting the Home Rule Act and Catholics
strongly supporting the act. Eventually, war broke out between the Irish nationalists and
British called the Anglo-Irish War. The war would result in the Anglo-Irish treaty which
created an independent Ireland which consisted of all majority Catholic counties and
Northern Ireland which was mostly Protestant and would remain under British control.
The war and its aftermath would only intensify the religious divide between Protestants
and Catholics and help the IRA continuously recruit new members. The political views of
Irish Catholics and Protestants were for the most part polar opposites because Catholics
supported Irish nationalism and while Protestants supported maintaining Ireland’s union
with England. This political divide between nationalists and unionists throughout the
1900’s would not just lead to a political conflict between unionists and nationalists, but a
religious conflict as well because of how Protestants and Catholics had such divided
political beliefs regarding England. The political struggle between both sides would become
a religious struggle as well, and would help the IRA gain members as religious differences
between unionists and nationalists became a major factor influencing Irish Catholics to join
the IRA.

Easter Rising
The Irish nationalist movement began to gain even more momentum on April 24th,
1917 it was Easter and a rebellion started in Dublin that lasted several days. The Irish
Republican Brotherhood and another group called the Irish Volunteers organized and
launched the rebellion and claimed the land they controlled to be ruled under the Irish
Republic, free from British rule. The Easter Rising only lasted five days until the British
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army had destroyed the rebellion and restored English control. Despite the uprising’s
defeat, it did succeed in changing Ireland’s political atmosphere. After the uprising was
crushed, British troops executed all of the leaders who organized the plot and imprisoned
many other nationalist participants. The British army also destroyed many homes and
businesses in Dublin after the rising. The British army’s punishment of those active in the
rebellion and destruction of private property in Dublin were done in the hope that it would
create fear among Irish nationalists and deter any further rebellion. However, the British
army’s actions had an adverse effect and actually promoted nationalist sentiment among
Irish Catholics. “Together with the post-Rising arrest and internment of many people, the
executions produced sympathy for that rebel cause which they were supposed to
undermine. The dead rebels became martyrs... A cult had come into existence, with a quasisacred quality attaching itself to the rebel leaders after the Rising had entered popular
imagination. Catholic Ireland had found new heroes, and their celebration-unsurprisinglypossessed a markedly religious flavor”18 After the Easter Rising those who took part
succeeded in spreading their vision of a sovereign Ireland to the Irish Catholic population.
The Easter Rising proved to be the spark that ignited Irish Catholics to pursue the
development of a free Irish state.
While the Easter rising occurred before the founding of the IRA, it proved to be an
essential event that led to the creation of the IRA and helped maintain its recruiting for a
long period of time. Before the Easter Rising, Irish nationalists relied on diplomatic
methods to gain varying forms of independence from England. Despite diplomatic means

18
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being successful in leading to the approval of the Thirds Home Rule Act giving Ireland only
domestic power, many British politicians and Irish unionists strongly opposed the
implementation and many militaristic unionists groups formed. They included both the
Irish Republican Brotherhood and the Volunteers. Both of these groups were hardline
nationalist groups who believed that in order to create a better Ireland an independent
Irish state was vital, and the use of violence was justified in order to achieve this goal.
However, before the Easter Rising many Irish nationalists did not share this view and many
of these groups were small and without much influence. Nevertheless, due to the Easter
Rising and its aftermath, many Irish nationalists and Catholics began to believe that an
Independent Irish state was needed and that diplomatic methods would potentially not be
useful without violent actions. The sentiment that developed among many Irish nationalists
and Catholics that violence was necessary, helped spur the formation and successful
recruitment of the IRA because it created a large population of Irish nationalists and
Catholics who would be potential recruits for the IRA.
With the Easter Rising changing the public’s perspective of Ireland’s relationship
with Britain, existing nationalist groups also changed. Before the Easter Rising, many
nationalistic groups existed although none had a large amount of members or carried out a
significant amount of civil unrest. After the rising, more Irish citizens began to join
nationalist groups to fight for Irish independence, but no groups changed as much as the
Volunteers. The Easter Rising changed everything for the Volunteers as older members left
and waves of new ambitious and energetic recruits joined the group filling old units and
creating numerous new units and becoming unofficially known as the IRA19. Many

19
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nationalist groups in Ireland faded away as the IRA gained thousands of members and
became even more powerful. The IRA eventually became the military power of the newly
formed Irish Parliament and was the main fighting force against the British in the AngloIrish war. With the IRA becoming the most powerful nationalist group, it became even
easier for the organization to recruit because recruits saw the IRA as being more promising
in creating an Irish state.
The Easter Rising proved to be a pivotal and critical moment for the IRA because it
led to the group’s creation and large-scale recruitment. Due to Irish Catholic and
nationalist’s very sympathetic views of the Easter Rising, many became more inclined to
join the IRA and fight the British instead of relying solely on diplomatic means20.
Eventually, the Anglo-Irish war ended in 1921 with the Anglo-Irish peace treaty signed
creating an independent Ireland with 26 counties and Northern Ireland with 6 counties
under British control which all had a Protestant a majority population. At the height of the
war there were believed to be about 100,000 members, but once the treaty was signed the
IRA was split on whether to accept the treaty or not and continue fighting. This divide
resulted in 90% percent of the IRA’s members leaving, choosing to accept the treaty while
the remaining members still believed that Northern Ireland should be incorporated into
the Republic of Ireland21. However, despite the IRA losing so many members the group
survived and eventually grew again due to the division of Ireland and Northern Ireland
being created based on sectarian lines, which created new issues and conflicts. For
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generations to come, Irish nationalists and Catholics were inspired to fight against the
British until they believed they had succeeded in uniting all of Ireland under one Irish
Republic.
The Troubles
The division of Northern Ireland and Ireland had been an issue since the Anglo-Irish
treaty was signed, however, it would become even more problematic during the late 1960s
and would help the IRA have a resurgence recruitment and strength. The minority
population of Catholics in Northern Ireland were viewed and treated as second class
citizens, and as Northern Irish Catholics began to clash with Protestants, North Ireland
Police, and British military forces, things quickly become much more violent in Northern
Ireland with smaller incidents happening in the Republic of Ireland and Britain. The uptick
in violence in the region is referred to as the Troubles Period because of the surge in
political violence that lasted from 1969 until the mid-1990s. Due to the political and
religious conflicts during the Troubles Period, the IRA experienced a surge in recruiting
between 1969 and the early 1970s and that helped lead to continued recruiting success for
decades and the group’s longevity. In the following section, I will explain events that
occurred during the Troubles Period and how they led to the IRA gaining and new recruits
and maintaining their influence in the region.

Battle Of Bogside
During the 1960’s, Bogside, a Catholic area in Derry, Northern Ireland was the home
of many civil rights demonstrations that protested for equal rights for Catholics primarily
in the areas of employment and political disfranchisement. However, no demonstration
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would have more of an effect than during annual parade called the Apprentice Boy Parade
in 1969. The parade celebrates the failed revolt of Catholic James II to Protestant William of
Orange who held the British throne. The parade had taken place for years and was meant to
humiliate Catholics and many indeed felt threatened by it. However, in 1969 as the parade
went past the Catholic community in Bogside, conflict erupted. A riot occurred once
Catholics began to protest the Parade as it traveled past Bogside, which was predominantly
Catholic. Fighting took place between Catholics on one side and Royal Ulster Constabulary
(Northern Ireland’s police force) and unionist Protestants on the other. The British army
was then deployed in order to stop the violence, eventually ending the Battle of Bogside
and resulting in great suffering within the Catholic community. “British forces were
dispatched on August 14th to help deescalate the situation. Despite their presence, violence
against the Catholic community continued: Loyalist Protestant mobs burnt down homes
and schools and murdered community members, while, in some instances, Northern Irish
authorities sat idly by observing the devastation and carnage”22. Despite the British army’s
presence, loyalist Protestants continued to attack the Catholic community and in some
instances in front of Northern Irish police who did nothing to stop the violence.
Due to Catholics being a minority in Northern Ireland, they were much more
vulnerable to violence because they were such a smaller population making them an easy
target for Protestants. Catholics were treated as second-class citizens in Northern Ireland,
which is why the Battle of Bogside occurred in the first place. The battle proved to many
Catholics that in order to protect themselves and end the discrimination they endured, they
22
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must take matters into their own hands because clearly the Northern Irish government and
its institutions did not regard Catholics as equals for if they had they would have
intervened and protected them.
The Battle of Bogside became a rallying call to Irish Catholics in both the Republic of
Ireland and Northern Ireland to fight back against Britain and loyalists because the
Catholics believed, and for good reason, that Catholics living in Northern Ireland were in
danger and England and political elites in Northern Ireland did not have any regard for the
minority population of Catholics. The IRA greatly benefited from the Battle of Bogside
because it caused numerous Catholics to join because many viewed the IRA as a necessity
to defend their communities.
Lorenzo Bosi conducted interviews of previous IRA members about why they
originally joined the IRA and quoted one former member who stated how the treatment of
Catholics in his community and himself by the British army and Protestants effected his
decision to join the IRA:
“In 1969 the Troubles broke out. I witnessed the burnings and some of the
shootings. I also witnessed the death of a school friend. Shortly after that I
was arrested for rioting behavior, and I was sentenced to two months in
prison. While I was in prison I met some people who were both members of
the Provisional IRA and of the Official IRA. While their influence was really
strong… they probably just stoked awareness then for the first time. It was
the first recollection of anything political. Before, during the very early stages
of the Troubles, I wouldn’t have known what was going on, the political
issues and colonization and all that, never gave [it] a thought a thought
before. And it [wa]s then, when I come out of the prison, late in 1971, that I
made my own choice to join the IRA; I decided to join the IRA to be able to
fight back at the British. I still did not understand the politics of Ireland… I
probably made my own conclusions very, very quickly, and I just made a
decision to join the IRA. With a sense of being able to strike back with any
sense of meaning at the British, at unionism. Not that I fully understood then,
but I just felt what was done towards us was wrong and that someone had to
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do something, and that is what it was that motivated me; a very, very simple
choice. (Interview no.4)23
Many members joined the IRA for similar reasons as the person in Bosi’s fourth
interview. Those who joined during in the late 1960’s and 1970’s had fewer political
reasons to become involved than previous members had. The IRA gained a large amount of
members who did not fully subscribe to the IRA’s nationalistic goals at the time they joined
because the majority was more interested in fighting the British and Protestants because of
the discrimination Irish Catholics were facing in Northern Ireland. The IRA provided an
avenue for Catholics who felt it was their responsibility to fight the British and Northern
Irish loyalists in order to create a state that protected Catholics. The individual in Bosi’s
fourth interview admitted to only knowing very little about the politics revolving around
Irish nationalism but due to their attraction to the IRA they soon adopted the group’s
ideology of uniting Ireland with Northern Ireland under the Republic of Ireland.
By looking at a graph below, it shows how Catholics in Northern Ireland were
subject to much more violence than Protestants during the Troubles.

23
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Sources: Irish Social Mobility Survey, 1973; Social Attitudes Survey, 1978; Social Identity
Survey, 1995; Northern Ireland Referendum and Election Survey, 1998. 24
This graph clearly shows the difference in the ways that Catholics and Protestants
experience violence in Northern Ireland. Catholics in Northern Ireland are more likely to be
intimidated by violence, witnessing violence, knowing someone who has been killed or
injured, and being a victim of violence themselves25. Hayes and McAlister wrote about the
differing views Protestants and Catholics and had towards the legitimacy of violence going
on during the Troubles based on a survey conducted in 1973, shortly after the Troubles
started:
“A more explicit question about the legitimacy of violence, divorced from
historical circumstances, produced different results in 1973. When asked if
they believed that violence was a legitimate way to achieve one’s goals, 16
percent of Protestants agreed, but more significantly, 25 percent of Catholics
took the same view. Clearly the violence of the early years of the conflict,
which had disproportionately affected Catholic areas, had caused a shift in

24
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opinion towards support for the use of violence in order to defend their areas
from Protestant attack.”26
The increased violence led to different views on the subject for Catholics and
Protestants. The higher amount of violence Catholics faced made many more Catholics view
their own use of violence as more legitimate, compared to the Protestants who were
exposed to much less. The sectarian divide and the increased amount of violence
experienced on the Catholic side can explain why the IRA was capable of continuously
gaining more members during the Troubles and after events like Bogside, because more
Catholics became supportive of the use of violence for political gains and the IRA provided
an organization for many Catholics who held this view27.
The Battle of Bogside would mark the beginning period of the Troubles in Ireland.
With Protestants attacking Catholic minorities and the lack of protection of Catholics being
provided by Northern Irish police, young Irish Catholics looked to the IRA as a source of
protection and as a means to resist oppression from Northern Irish Protestants. With the
Battle of Bogside, new IRA members were joining for religious reasons because they either
saw, knew or they themselves fell victim to violence due to their Catholic identity. The
Battle of Bogside led to the British Army being put in place to protect Catholics in Northern
Ireland, but this would only lead to more conflict between Catholics in Northern Ireland
against the Irish Protestants and British, resulting in the IRA gaining even more members.

Bloody Sunday
Only a few years after Battle of Bogside, another major event in Northern Ireland
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occurred that would help the IRA gain even more members. January 30th, 1972 came to be
known as Bloody Sunday as violence in Bogside erupted once again except this time
between Catholics and the British army. Since the Battle of Bogside, British troops were
stationed in Derry in order protect the Catholics from the Protestants and maintain peace.
The British army took steps which they believed would help maintain the peace such as
barricading nationalist areas, segregating and removing different nationalists and also a
policy of internment which allowed security forces to imprison suspected “troublesome”
nationalists and hold them without trial28. In response to the British army’s internment
policy, many Catholics took part in a march to protest, but the peaceful march soon turned
violent and resulted in the British army opening fire into a crowd of protestors. Patrick
Hicks describes the events of Bloody Sunday after interviewing many of those who
witnessed the event and writing:
“Like most atrocities, no one is exactly sure how this one began. The British
soldiers of the First Battalion Parachute Regiment claimed that they were
fired upon and that they thought nail bombs would be used against them.
The protesters have vigorously and repeatedly denied such claims. What we
do know is that shortly before 4 o'clock, the rifles opened up. In the car park
of Rossville Flats and near the army barricade on Rossville Street and in area
known as Glenfada Park, 13 lives were taken in less than 20 minutes. Five of
the dead were shot in the back. No weapon of any kind was ever found on the
marchers. When it was finally over, 21 soldiers had fired 108 rounds.
Altnagelvin Hospital was overrun with families who were desperate for news
of their loved ones. The next day, the Catholic community around Northern
Ireland rightfully felt that they were being targeted by the British army.
Whisperings of genocide began to fill the streets. Recruitment in the Irish
Republican Army skyrocketed and within a few short months bombs were
going off all over the place”29.
To this day there is confusion as to what led to the British troops to fire on the
protestors. Some say they were attacked first while others deny any violence being
28
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directed at the British soldiers. Upon the aftermath of the shooting it was brought to light
that none of the protestors shot were armed or even looking in the direction of the troops,
outrage broke out throughout Ireland and the Catholic communities in Northern Ireland.
Bloody Sunday served as an important symbol for the IRA because Bloody Sunday
symbolized the oppressive government that Irish Catholics in Northern Ireland endured.
The British Army, which was sent into Northern Ireland with the purpose of protecting
Catholics, had instead indiscriminately killed Catholics. In many of Lorenzo Bosi’s
interviews it was very common for IRA members to join because of the British Army’s
presence and action in Northern Ireland. In Bosi’s 15th interview the former IRA member
stated:
“The British army was here to oppress us. When I was going to school I was
stopped by the army. Actually it was then that I thought, this is wrong. I was
then joining riots in the streets. I made a choice at that time, there was
actually a slogan on the wall, “Join the Na Fianna Eireann,” so I went there,
and I asked, “Can I join?” and they asked, “Why do you want to join? ,” and I
said that “I Want to fight for Ireland.” What motivated me was a sense of
revolution to what the British were doing to our community. There was a
mobilization within the community against the British and what they are
doing, and I just became a part of that. There was a sense of patriotism, to
defend your people, a reactionary feeling, because you wanted to retaliate to
what the British were doing against your community”30 (Interview no. 15)
It was very common for IRA members to initially join because they felt oppressed by
Britain due to its military presence in Northern Ireland. The British army was sent to
protect Catholics, however, it also actively sought out to destroy the IRA in Northern
Ireland. Many of the tactics that the British army used only further alienated Catholics and
drove more to join the IRA. For example, in Lower Falls, a considered nationalist area, a
curfew was implemented and 3,000 troops conducted house searches. Five people died
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during these searches and the IRA responded and claimed to provide the only effective
defense for Northern Catholics and nationalists. From that time on, Catholics started to
believe the IRA was the only force capable of defending them; not the British military31.
Bloody Sunday, much like the Battle of Bogside, proved to be an important symbol for the
IRA because to Catholics in Northern Ireland, the British army represented their status of
second-class citizens and the oppression they faced in Northern Ireland. The IRA was
enticing for recruits because of events like Bloody Sunday and other actions the British
military carried out in Northern Ireland. These incidents were enough proof for many
Catholics that the British army was not here to defend them, but to further oppress them,
and that it was necessary to join the IRA to fight back.
Hunger Strikes
When people first think of hunger strikes, Mahatma Gandhi in India is the first to
come to mind. However, Irish nationalists were the first to use hunger strikes as a form of
political protest in the early 1900s. Irish nationalists (many of which were IRA members)
would hold hunger strikes in order to attempt to force the British to immediately to give up
certain actions, policies, or laws throughout the 1900s. The ideologies behind the hunger
strikes by Irish nationalists were to force the British to quickly adhere to the nationalist’s
demands or risk the deaths of numerous strikers. The hunger strikes also served a more
long-term purpose, which was to gain sympathy and support from the Irish public to
support the nationalists against the British, which in turn led to increased IRA membership.
How did hunger strikes in Ireland help gain support for nationalists and the IRA?
Hunger Strikes were successful in gaining support for nationalists and the IRA because of
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Ireland’s history with hunger strikes, religious attributes associated with hunger strikes,
and the negative characterization strikers created for the British and unionists in the eyes
of many Irish nationalists and Catholics. The hunger strikes alone did not gain support
from Irish civilians but due to their association with Irish culture and Catholicism in
Ireland, they succeeded in gaining nationalist support causing IRA membership to increase.
Hunger Strikes have always been a common practice in Ireland dating all the way
back to the medieval period. Hunger strikes were very different in medieval Ireland than
hunger strikes in Ireland during the 1900s. Despite that, medieval hunger strikes in Ireland
created an Irish culture that felt empathy for those who partake in such a protest and this
sympathetic culture towards hunger strikers would continue to exist during the strike of
the 1900s. David Beresford describes Ireland’s medieval hunger strikes writing,
“The earlier records place its origins in medieval Ireland where, as Troscad
(fasting on or against a person) or Cealachan (achieving justice by
starvation), it had a place in the civil code, the Senchus Mor. The code
specified the circumstances in which it could be used to recover a debt, or a
right to perceived justice, the complainant fasting on the doorstep of the
defendant. If the hunger striker was allowed to die the person at whose door
he starved himself was held responsible for his death and had to pay
compensation to his family. It is probable that such fasting had particular
moral force at the time because honor attached to hospitality and the
dishonor of having a person starving outside one’s house”32.
Two major differences between the hunger strikes of medieval Ireland and those of
20th century Ireland were what they were protesting for and whom they were protesting
against. In medieval Ireland, hunger strikes were carried out by individuals against other
individuals who they believe owed them some form of reparation for causing the protestor
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some perceived injustice. But 20th century hunger strikes were not protesting against
individuals, but were political protests against the British or unionists to encourage
political change.
Despite that, Irish society’s cultural views towards protestors and those being
protested against through hunger strikes had not changed much over the years. Irish
society saw hospitality as a virtue and allowing someone to starve outside your house due
to your disagreement was considered inhumane and dishonorable no matter how innocent
the defendant may be, thus if the person carrying out the hunger strike died, the defendant
had to pay his or her family reparations and were looked poorly upon by those within their
community. In the 1900’s, this view was commonly shared and the multitude of hunger
strikes carried out by Irish nationalists grew. The majority of hunger strikes occurred
inside prisons where the British held IRA members or other political prisoners. Hunger
strikes would be organized and launched by prisoners who could be protesting a variety of
things such as prison conditions, the reasoning for their incarceration, or to support issues
other prisoners may be facing. The Irish public viewed England as cruel, similar to an
individual allowing a protestor to die in medieval Ireland, for not giving into hunger strikes
and allowing Irish nationalists to suffer and die.
The British inability to end multiple hunger strikes led to increased recruitment for
the IRA because people were outraged and felt sympathetic to the protestors and saw their
deaths as unnecessary. The Irish view towards those who conduct hunger strikes and those
who are targeted in those protests did not change between medieval Ireland and 20th
century Ireland and the same sentiments towards hunger strikes helped lead to increased
recruitment for the IRA.

27
Hunger Strikes in Ireland also had a religious element to them, which helped the IRA
gain recruits. Due to the conflict being a sectarian struggle once the IRA and other
nationalists started to use hunger strikes to protest, it helped the IRA gain new recruits
because of the Christian idea of self-sacrifice. “Fasting quickly established itself within
Christianity in the Ireland as a purely symbolic gesture. Fasting and self-sacrifice in general
began to have a special value in the development of Irish-Christian traditions, more
particularly so it was linked to or offered up to God in unison with the suffering and selfsacrifice of Christ33” In Irish Catholic tradition, self-sacrifice had a high value because of
Christ’s self-sacrifice, and once protestors began to use hunger strikes, Irish Catholics
widely supported those striking and viewed them very admirably. New members began to
join the IRA because the strikes proved to many Catholics that the IRA would fight for their
religious equality because the strikers displayed the Catholic virtue of self-sacrifice. The
strikers also showed how determined and strong they were by enduring pain for so long
and demonstrating their willingness to die, which helped the IRA gain new members who
joined because of the protestor’s commitment.
The 1981 hunger strikes are a prime example of how hunger strikes helped the IRA
and Irish nationalism as a whole gain more support. The 1981 Hunger Strikes occurred
because in 1976 the British government announced it would not maintain a special
category for prisoners imprisoned for paramilitary actions but regard them as regular
prisoners. In addition, Britain passed the responsibility of security of Northern Ireland
from the British army onto RUC34. In response to being regarded as regular prisoners and
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not paramilitary prisoners, imprisoned IRA members started a hunger strike, led by Bobby
Sands an IRA commander, for their status as paramilitary prisoners to be reinstated. The
hunger strike gained a lot of support from those throughout Ireland who saw those taking
part as admirable for their devotion due to their willingness of committing to self-sacrifice
for their cause. The strike ended up having more of an impact on Ireland than expected.
Sands ended up winning a seat in Fermanagh-South Tyrone over unionist Harry West,
however, he died shortly afterward but his funeral also showed the impact his hunger
strike had on the Catholic population with an estimated 100,000 people coming to pay their
respects and honor him for his self sacrifice35. Nine other protestors died from starvation
and shortly after the strike ended. The strike had significant political ramifications as Sin
Fein, the Irish nationalist party, gained a significant amount of seats especially those in
Northern Ireland, which was very surprising. The IRA also gained numerous members
because of the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s policy of attempting to work
with the protestors and allowing them to die. In a response to one of the protestor’s sisters
asking the Prime Minister to stop the protest, Prime Minster Thatcher responded saying
she wouldn’t, writing:
“I want you to know that despite what is said and written by some people
about my attitude to the hunger strike, I very much regret that young men
have been prepared to throw away their lives for an objective which – as I
have said on many occasions – no responsible Government anywhere could
grant, since it could only aid and abet those who advocate and use violence to
political ends36.”
The Prime Minister’s unwillingness to try and stop the hunger strike created a lot of
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anger among many in Ireland so the IRA capitalized on this and gained more recruits. The
IRA almost successfully assassinated her, which proved to many that the IRA was a serious
group determined to fight the British and end Catholic suffering in Northern Ireland
bringing in more recruits into the fold.
The combination of Ireland’s cultural history and Irish Catholicism’s association to
hunger strikes helped draw in many recruits for the IRA. The public in Ireland viewed
protestors in hunger strikes favorably because they represented Catholicism and
willingness to self-sacrifice, which inspired many to join the IRA. The hunger strikes also
cast the British as cruel oppressors willing to allow protestors to starve themselves to
death which helped gain sympathy from many in Ireland. Because of Ireland’s culture of
hospitality, the British willingness to allow Irish nationalist Catholics to starve themselves
was viewed as unacceptable and drove more people to join the IRA.
Concluding Points on IRA
The purpose of this case study was to look at how recruitment is what led the IRA to
exist longer than any other modern terrorist organization, and how many of the same
recruitment characteristics of the IRA are shared by modern religious terrorist
organizations. The IRA was meant to be a secular organization, which fought for the
creation of an independent Ireland and later unification of the Republic of Ireland with
Northern Ireland, but ended up having non-secular characteristics. The IRA was not
completely secular because the different political views by Protestants and Catholics led to
a sectarian divide between the two. The IRA benefited from the political divide between
Catholics and Protestants because it helped the organization continue to gain members
inspired to fight against the British and Northern Irish Protestants. Policies created and
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physical force used by the British and Protestants, aimed to suppress Irish nationalist’s
claims for an independent and unified Ireland, backfired because with most nationalists
being Catholic, it created a perception among Catholics that they were being suppressed
due to their religious beliefs and led to many individuals joining the IRA. The IRA also used
hunger strikes, which were popular in Irish Catholic tradition because they resembled
Christ’s self-sacrifice, which helped gain sympathy and more members for the IRA because
they saw the IRA as a righteous and serious organization. Due to the IRA’s link with
Catholicism through sectarian issues and religious symbols, it was capable of recruiting for
generations and allowed the group to exist for nine decades. With religious terrorist
organizations such as al Qaeda and ISIS sharing many of the same characteristics as the
IRA, it suggests that they have the ability to survive for much longer than previous
terrorists organizations and exist for just as long as the IRA.
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Al Qaeda and ISIS
Today’s terrorist groups have the ability to survive for much longer than those that
existed in the past because they have distinct recruiting advantages that were not
previously available. Religious ideologies, religious symbols, sectarian issues, and
globalization due to advancements in technology have all been beneficial to the survival of
current religious terrorist groups because they generate more potential recruits for these
organizations. By focusing on two terrorist organizations, al Qaeda and The Islamic State
(ISIS), which formed out of al Qaeda, one can see how their successful recruitment has led
to their continued survival amid the numerous difficulties each has faced. Both groups are
Islamic terrorist organizations, however, both had different political and religious
ideologies along with different recruitment strategies. They have similarities in
recruitment strategies in that they focus on appealing to recruits through their religious
ideals and rely on modern technology in order to promote their causes.
Al Qaeda
Background:
The origins of al Qaeda can first be drawn back to the militant group the
mujahedeen. The mujahedeen had developed in order to fight back against the newly
formed Afghani government, the Peoples democracy of Afghanistan, in 1978. Due to the
government’s lack of power it allied itself with the Soviet Union who would send 30,000
troops to defend and assist the new Afghani government against the rebels. With
widespread distaste of the new government’s policies and the presence of Soviet soldiers
among Muslims in the country, the mujahedeen fought both of them until the Soviet army
left and the Peoples Democracy of Afghanistan had fallen. Shortly after, Osama bin Laden, a
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former mujahedeen member, would become the leader of al Qaeda. Al Qaeda was founded
under the ideology that Muslim countries should abandon secularism and adopt
governments and public affairs that are guided by Islamic law. In doing so, al Qaeda needed
to end U.S. and Western power in the Middle East because of the influence they had over
the region. In order to establish Islamic states in the Middle East, al Qaeda launched a
terrorist campaign against the United States and their fatal attack on 9/11 would change
the way the world looked at terrorism. Shortly after the attack, the U.S. invaded
Afghanistan to crush al Qaeda. That has yet to occur and al Qaeda still operates sixteen
years after the attack.
In what follows, I am going to examine the religious aspects of al Qaeda that helped
the group attain thousands of followers, ultimately allowing the group to survive for over a
decade despite the enormous effort put in by the United States and its allies to destroy the
al Qaeda organization.
Religiosity
As previously discussed, the religiosity of religious terrorist groups is questionable,
and when looking at al Qaeda, one can see that the religious ideologies of al Qaeda do not
seem to be the focal point of the group’s existence, but are instead entwined within the
group’s political aims in order to justify their claims37. Specifically, al Qaeda desires to
create and promote Islamic fundamentalism in Middle Eastern states and other highly
populated Muslim countries. Islamic fundamentalism became a popular movement shortly
after the Iranian revolution when the Government of Islamic Republic was created. Al
Qaeda and Osama bin laden believed it was necessary for Muslim countries to adopt
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Islamic governments and abandon existing secular governments as Iran did. However, they
saw that in order to do so it was imperative to end foreign influence in the Middle East,
especially influence from the United States and other western powers.
Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda wanted to create political change in the Middle East
and end the influence of foreign powers in the region which was a popular philosophy
among many in the Middle East. However, al Qaeda, and its leader Osama bin Laden,
needed to become even more popular and gain more members if it were to launch a
successful or lasting campaign. In order to do this, al Qaeda aimed at persuading Muslims
to join because of the religious disdain the U.S and the west had towards Muslims. An
anonymous CIA operative in his book ”Imperial Hubris” describes how Osama bin Laden
created a sense that western powers, especially the U.S., is a force that must be met with
violence because of the destruction that the U.S. was causing and will continue to inflict on
Muslims:
“Part of bin Laden's genius is that he recognized early on the difference
between issues Muslims find offensive about America and the West, and
those they find intolerable and life threatening. The difference, that is, that
moves large numbers of people from demonstrating with placards to
demolishing with plastic explosives. And in the movement-causing category
fall, almost exclusively, U.S. political, military, and economic policies toward
the Islamic world”38.
Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda conveyed that their political goals were religiously
motivated because they wanted to mobilize more Muslims to use physical force to resist
the U.S. and did so by framing that United States foreign policy as being detrimental to
Muslims. They knew that just simply highlighting the differences concerning political and
cultural issues between the Middle East and the West would not gain as much support for
38

Anonymous, Imperial Hubris, [Page 7].

34
their terrorist group39. Al Qaeda would point to U.S. foreign policy issues such as the United
States support of Israel and how this alliance had been detrimental to Muslims and, in fact,
could be seen as an attack on Islam. Osama bin Laden wrote a letter to America outlining
the reasons why the U.S was an enemy to al Qaeda and thus promoted using violence to end
American foreign policy actions in the Middle East, writing:
You attacked us in Palestine…Palestine, which has sunk under military
occupation for more than 80 years. The British handed over Palestine, with
your help and your support, to the Jews, who have occupied it for more than
50 years; years overflowing with oppression, tyranny, crimes, killing,
expulsion, destruction and devastation. The creation and continuation of
Israel is one of the greatest crimes, and you are the leaders of its criminals.
And of course there is no need to explain and prove the degree of American
support for Israel…Each and every person whose hands have become
polluted in the contribution towards this crime must pay its price” [Letter
from bin Laden to America in 2002]40.
Shortly after WWII, the British controlled modern day Israel and despite most of the
land being inhabited by Muslims, the British allowed for the Jewish state of Israel to be
created resulting in thousands of Muslims being displaced by the Jewish State. Since then,
the Jewish state has continued to grow and has pushed further into Palestinian territory
causing more displacement of Muslims and continued conflicts between Palestinians and
Israel. Due to the U.S. support of Israel, especially through military and economic means,
the U.S. has become a major issue for Muslims wishing to stop Israel’s control of the Holy
Land and continued suppression of Muslims in Israel and Palestine. Due to the U.S
supporting Israel, many Muslims worldwide see the U.S. support of a harsh Israel as anti
Islamic. This idea was extremely popular within al Qaeda. As seen above in bin Laden’s
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statement, he claims that the U.S support of Israel is a crime against Muslims because the
U.S. holds responsibility for the oppression that many Muslims face because of Israel. Yildar
Muhammad, an al Qaeda member, writes about how the United States support of Israel was
part of his motivation to join al Qaeda and said, “All of us have grown up learning about
injustice brought on Palestine. My generation was never able to do anything about that.
This was the chance for me and my generation to take up the cause and take on the root of
the cause, which is American and its support for Israel”41.
Al Qaeda also points out other oppressive U.S foreign policy issues in the Middle
East such as U.S military bases in the region, desire for oil, and economic sanctions placed
on Muslim majority countries42. Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda blame many of the issues
Muslims in the Middle East face on U.S foreign policy which they said has led to economic
issues, oppression of Muslims, lack of sovereignty, and starvation in some cases, such as in
Iraq after the U.S. placed sanctions on the country43. Al Qaeda uses the outcome of U.S.
foreign policies on Muslims and highlights them as attacks on all Muslims and Islam and
claim that the U.S. is doing this intentionally. By al Qaeda claiming that their political issues
with the Middle East policies of the U.S and the West are truly based on religious issues,
they were able to develop more membership because Muslims then began to view Islam as
being oppressed by foreign powers. Religious terrorists groups use religion to portray their
conflict as good versus evil and to demonize any opposing views of the group, which is the
effect al Qaeda had by portraying the U.S. as an evil force against Islam44.
Religious Symbols
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Al Qaeda, like many other religious terrorists groups, uses religious symbols and
historical moments to support their ideology as a way to appeal to potential recruits. In
secular and non-secular religious terrorist groups, symbols are important for group
cohesion and recruitment. For religious terrorists, these effects are enhanced because
religious symbols are generally even more powerful than symbols non-secular terrorist
groups use45. This is a successful recruiting method used by al Qaeda because most of their
recruits and members do not have a full understanding of their own religion and are
vulnerable to misinterpretations of it, so al Qaeda can use Islamic symbols and history to
“insert a skewed view of Islamic teachings into their heads”46. The ability of al Qaeda to
insert their views of Islam and how Islam pertains to current political issues helps the
organization recruit new members because they can effectively develop the religious and
political views of individuals who are susceptible to al Qaeda’s teachings, and convince
them that joining al Qaeda is in their best interests.
One of the common religious symbols al Qaeda uses, along with other Islamic
terrorists including ISIS, is the Islamic ideology of jihad. The word jihad is an Islamic term
with many meanings. One is someone’s internal struggle with his faith in Islam. Another is
striving to preach the teachings of Islam and directly translates to “struggling or striving”47.
Despite that, jihad is now popularly thought to be the use of violence by an individual or
group who claim to use it to fight for Islam which, is in large part, because of today’s Islamic
terrorists declaring their violent struggle as being motivated by religion. Like majority of
religions, Islam promotes peace and strongly condemns the killing of any other person,
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however, it also mentions how violence can be used in order to defend oneself, those in
their community, and the Islamic faith48. Al Qaeda and other Islamic terrorists have
declared jihad in order to gain support from other Muslims and display to potential recruits
that their use of violence, also used by other religious groups, is a divine duty because it is
religiously imperative49. Nevertheless, al Qaeda does not properly adhere to the
mainstream ideology of military jihad, according to many Islamic scholars, yet, with al
Qaeda taking advantage of individual’s lack of religious education, they have projected their
perception of jihad onto others and convinced them to join and fight with al Qaeda. The
Islamic Supreme Council of America outlines the term jihad and in the description it states,
“If there is no peaceful alternative, Islam also allows the use of force, but there are strict
rules of engagement. Innocents - such as women, children, or invalids - must never be
harmed, and any peaceful overtures from the enemy must be accepted”50. Clearly al
Qaeda’s claim to fighting jihad does not fit into this definition of a physical force of jihad
because it does not follow the strict rules of engagement for starters, yet due to al Qaeda’s
ability to spread their religious ideology to the religiously uninformed, it does not matter.
Al Qaeda can inspire many members to join through the idea of a “defensive jihad” because
misinformed recruits may believe that al Qaeda is properly adhering to the rules of jihad
despite its very strange interpretation of it.
Al Qaeda’s use of jihad is unique from other Islamic terrorist groups due to the fact
that al Qaeda stresses that its use of jihad is only being implemented for defensive

Anonymous, Imperial Hubris, [Page 14].
Anonymous, Imperial Hubris, [Page 10].
50 SHAYKH MUHAMMAD HISHAM KABBANI, "Jihad: A Misunderstood," The Islamic Supreme
Council of America.
48
49

38
purposes for Muslims and Islam. This type of jihad is known as a “defensive jihad” because
al Qaeda claims to be fighting the U.S. in order to defend Islam and Muslims, and doesn’t
seek to a become an offensive organization with more expansionist goals. In one message
read by Osama bin Laden he states, “crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a
clear declaration of war on God, his messenger, and Muslims”. Bin Laden asserts that al
Qaeda’s attacks against the United States are not meant to be offensive attacks, but
defensive because the United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East has forced al Qaeda
to act defensively. Many people in the Muslim world already dislike U.S. presence in their
countries and view the U.S. as an imperial and colonial power and that the War on
Terrorism is instead a war on Islam51. Due to many Muslims believing U.S. actions in the
Middle East are focused on attacking Islam, al Qaeda’s portrayal of fighting a “defensive
jihad” may draw in many recruits who desire to protect Islam from America.
Many critics of al Qaeda’s claim of fighting a “defensive jihad” point out that al Qaeda
is more offensive than defensive because al Qaeda routinely targets civilians and launches
aggressive attacks against the U.S. However, al Qaeda still states that these attacks are in
reaction to the U.S. attack on Islam because citizens elect those in the U.S. government and
pay taxes. Osama bin Laden explains why civilians are also targets saying, “A man is
considered a fighter whether he carries a gun or pays taxes to help kill us. So when they
say bin Laden kills civilians, who are they killing in Palestine? Children. Our aim is that
every American man is an enemy whether he kills us or pays taxes to kill us”52. According
to bin Laden, American civilians may as well be soldiers because they pay taxes and shape
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the U.S government though elections and that has led to the death of many Muslims. Al
Qaeda describes their seemingly aggressive attacks as part of their “defensive jihad”
despite the fact that they are aimed at civilians. Al Qaeda holds U.S. civilians responsible for
the government’s actions because they elect those in power. Mohammed Siddique Khan is a
former al Qaeda member and leader of the 2005 London suicide bombings, and he
described why he and al Qaeda were targeting civilians writing,
“Your (the West’s) democratically elected governments continue to
perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world. Your support for
them makes you directly responsible ... until we feel security, you will be our
targets. Until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my
people, we will not stop”53.
In his statement, one can clearly see how he still portrays western countries as the
aggressors against Muslims due to their foreign policy activities in the Middle East. He also
holds citizens of these countries responsible for U.S. actions and considers them to be
potential targets if their governments continue attacking Islam. They deserve what they get
because they selected their states’ leaders who have caused devastation for many Muslims
in the Middle East. Al Qaeda has continuously tried to promote their defensive jihadist view
in order to gain recruits because many Muslims view the U.S as an enemy to Islam and by al
Qaeda proclaiming to defend Muslims many recruits may be inspired to join.
In the Qur’an it also teaches that it is each Muslim’s personal responsibility to
contribute to a jihad in any way they can if Islam, its followers, or their land is under attack
and those that don’t partake, will face God’s judgment54. This places an incentive for
Muslims to join because they may feel devoted to protect Islam. As previously referenced,
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many al Qaeda members are not fully educated in their religion and if Al Qaeda can
persuade recruits that Islam is under threat, they may join al Qaeda’s “defensive jihad”.
Jihad is an important symbol for al Qaeda’s recruitment because their claim to be fighting a
“defensive jihad” paints the U.S. as the aggressor because of American foreign policy. In
addition, many Muslims already believe that the U.S. is waging a war on Islam regardless of
al Qaeda’s influence. A “defensive jihad” may appear to be more attractive to those Muslims
leading to additional recruits joining al Qaeda. On top of that it is also the personal
obligation of each Muslim to assist in a jihad in any way they can, and for those that view
the U.S. as an enemy to Islam, they may be much more inclined to join al Qaeda and wage a
“defensive jihad”.
Al Qaeda also uses historical religious events to help gain recruits. For example,
Osama bin Laden would often say that the U.S. is like the Christians in The Crusades,
leading multiple campaigns against Muslims in order to take their holy lands. Bin Laden
would say things such as “The new crusade led by the Americans against the Islamic
nations” and how a battle would sure be soon to begin “between the Islamic world and the
Americans and their Allies”55. Al Qaeda describes the predominantly Christian U.S. as
modern crusaders wishing to take control of the Holy Land and Middle East and in doing so
cause harm to Muslims along the way. The connection of The Crusades and the U.S. foreign
policy by al Qaeda served as an important recruitment tactic because it symbolized the
effects the U.S had on Muslims and also painted U.S involvement in the Middle East as
aggressive. Al Qaeda’s description of America as being modern day crusaders could also be
tied into the al Qaeda ideology of waging a “defensive jihad” because by al Qaeda
55

Anonymous, Imperial Hubris, [Page 16].

41
portraying the U.S as a crusader, they could state they were fighting in reaction to the
aggressive and predatory United States. A former al Qaeda member named Momin Khawaja
talked about his view of the United States being a modern crusader as a reason for his
radicalization stating,
“Would the American and British political leaders learn any lessons from
their failure in the on-going wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? For over 13 years,
they were not engaged to promote democracy or to protect human dignity
and rights or any logical discourse against the ruthless authoritarianism.
They are leading a new Crusade against the Muslim world. Every beginning
has its end. It is just that most transgressors do not know about it when they
crossover the limits of the Laws of God”56.
Khawaja, and other al Qaeda recruits, understand U.S foreign policy to be a modern
day crusade because of al Qaeda’s use of the historical significance as well as the many
actions the U.S takes in the Middle East which violate the sovereignty of many Middle
Eastern countries. Many Muslims around the world, whether or not they are a member of a
terrorist group, view U.S. actions as a War on Islam,57 and al Qaeda uses this popular idea
and ties it back to The Crusades to help gain sympathy and legitimize the organization’s use
of violence, helping them grow their membership.
The way al Qaeda proclaims their use of “defensive jihad” and their portrayal of the
United States as crusaders is done in order to gain recruits and sympathizers, which has
helped the group survive for decades. Due to al Qaeda being focused on fighting foreign
powers, it is essential for them to use historical and religious symbols to make the U.S.
appear even more aggressive in order to demonize the U.S. Al Qaeda’s use of jihad and
historical moments is very similar to the hunger strikes used by IRA members. Both
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terrorist groups used historically religious motivated techniques and in doing so gained
sympathy for their organization, causing more members to join, helping both groups
survive for so long.
ISIS
Background:
The Islamic state first formed in 1999, but did not start gaining international
attention until recently. The Islamic state began in Iraq shortly after the U.S invasion of Iraq
in 2003, and was led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Bin Laden funded Zarqawi’s organization in
Iraq, however, with Zarqawi not sharing the same goals as bin Laden and al Qaeda, the
Islamic State did not affiliate itself with al Qaeda until negotiations between the two groups
led to the unification of the jihadist groups and the Islamic state renaming itself “al Qaeda
of Iraq” (AQI)58. Despite the two groups unification, there were still stark differences
between the al Qaeda and its affiliate AQI. Over time, different political events, diverging
ideologies, and al Qaeda’s organization would cause AQI and al Qaeda to cut ties and AQI to
rename itself ISIS in 2012. In 2012, the Islamic State would experience a revival as new
members flocked to ISIS under new leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi due to the group’s idea of
establishing an Islamic state, increased violence in Iraq, and the beginning of the Syrian
Civil War.
Religiosity
Despite both groups wishing to form Islamic governments, ISIS has a much more
hardline approach and its goals are focused more on challenging the current state system
by unifying Muslim countries in the Middle East under a caliphate, while al Qaeda worked
58
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to establish Islamic State governments in existing states. Despite these different political
ambitions, they both are supporting the development of Islamic government, though the
Islamic States’ political goals matched with their religious perception of their political goals
have led to much more recruitment for ISIS since its revival in 2012.
While both groups wish to overthrow governments in the Middle East and form
Islamic governments, they view their enemies, as well as the obstacles preventing them
from achieving their goals, differently. Al Qaeda viewed foreign actors, specifically the U.S.,
as their enemies who were preventing the development of Islamic governments. Therefore,
their focus was primarily on fighting the U.S. ISIS’s ideology is different in that the group
believes that regional actors are the main force preventing the creation of Islamic
governments so they focus more of their attention to combating those within their region,
specifically the Asad regime in Syria, Abadi regime in Iraq, and those that do not adhere to
their political and religious ideologies.59
ISIS focuses their attention and resources more on regional adversaries because
they wish to develop a caliphate, which is a Muslim community in a region, ruled over by a
political and religious leader the called caliph who is meant to be the successor of
Muhammad. ISIS linked their political aspiration of establishing a caliphate to Muhammad’s
travel from Mecca to Medina in 622 C.E when Muhammad established a caliphate in
Medina, which was the first base in which Islam began to grow after he fled Mecca to
escape religious persecution. Sabhan Khalef Ali al-Juburi, an ISIS leader, spoke about how
he and ISIS are following the work of the Prophet stating, “Following the example of the
Prophet when he left Mecca for Medina and established the Islamic State there, not-
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withstanding the alliance of the idolaters and the People of the Book against him…the
territories under our control equal in expanse the first State in Medina”60. ISIS’s goal in
establishing a caliphate has been popular among many jihadists and has been a major
incentive for new members who wish to join in order to unite all Muslims under one
caliphate and end existing state governments.
Before ISIS split from al Qaeda, central al Qaeda leadership supported the Islamic
States’ desire to develop a caliphate in Iraq, but al Qaeda’s support of ISIS started to fade
due to al Qaeda losing control of its own state building abilities, the hardline ideologies of
the Islamic State and ISIS’s eagerness to become engaged in Syria61. If jihadist groups were
placed on a political spectrum, al Qaeda would be placed on the left and ISIS on the far right
because ISIS has a much stricter ideology of the Qur’an and its goal in creating a caliphate
for all Muslims; a much less popular idea for al Qaeda62.
However, al Qaeda did not understand the high number of jihadists that support this
much more conservative political and religious ideology, which led to many jihadists
joining ISIS instead of al Qaeda. ISIS’s early success in 2014, in which it took large amount
of territory in Iraq and Syria, helped prove to many jihadists that the organization was
determined to focus on establishing a caliphate and not fighting foreign powers as al Qaeda
did in order for states to individually form Islamic governments. “The reality of a protostate and ISIS’s willingness to try to govern- this Khilafa project, as many within the group
call it- is quite appealing to jihadists. ISIS is not only talking the talk about establishing an

Bunzel, "From Paper," [Page 18].
Bunzel, "From Paper," [Page 17].
62 Byman, "Comparing Al Qaeda," Brookings.edu.
60
61

45
Islamic state, it is walking the walk”63 which, has attracted many foreign fighters to its side.
Al-Azy was a captured member of ISIS and in an interview with CNN from his prison cell in
Iraq, he explained why he joined ISIS stating, “I was a believer. I believed in the caliphate
and I believed in the Islamic State. They said the pledge to the caliph is from the days of the
Prophet and those who don't pledge are not Muslims. I was convinced by this”64. ISIS’s
political goal of uniting Syria and Iraq and forming a caliphate as the Prophet had done has
been popular among jihadists and along with ISIS success in gaining territory, the group
had legitimized itself to many recruits. The very conservative ideology of ISIS and its ability
to form a caliphate has led to increased membership from individuals such as al-Azy
because they believe in the formation of the caliphate and see joining ISIS as the best
means to do so because the organization has been quite successful in doing so.
Religious/ Political issues which help Recruitment
One essential recruitment tool for ISIS has been Sunni disfranchisement and
growing sectarian lines in Iraq and Syria. For centuries, since the religious split of the Sunni
and Shiite Muslims, there has been conflict between both sects and ISIS has cleverly used
this sectarian struggle, especially with tensions between both sects worsening in both
states, to recruit many members65. ISIS claims to be the champion of Sunni Muslims in
their struggles against the Iraqi and Syrian regimes. Because of the political climates in
both countries, many Sunni Muslims have been convinced that it is necessary for them to
join ISIS because they believe that Sunni’s are under attack and that they must fight back,
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and that a Sunni Muslim Caliphate will create a government that best represents Sunni
interests.
One major factor, which has helped draw in thousands of recruits for ISIS and led to
the group’s revival back in 2012, is the Syrian conflict. Many ISIS members joined because
they see the violent struggle in the Syrian Civil War in sectarian terms. For decades, Syria
has been under the rule of the Assad family while the Sunni Muslims who make up about
75% of Syria’s population have experienced repression. The Alawites make up only 15% of
population but have control of the government and private sector66. The civil war started in
2011 when protests erupted in Syria over the discontent with the Assad-controlled
government and for the removal of Bashar-al-Assad as the President of Syria. Once these
protests were met with a violent response by the Assad government, a war started between
the rebels and the government with Sunni Muslims making up the majority of the Syrian
rebels. The religious and political divide that developed between the Syrian government
and the Syrian Sunni population helped ISIS recruit thousands of members. Many ISIS
members joined because they believed that Sunni Muslims in Syria face genocide and that
they have a moral obligation to defend other Sunni Muslims and their religious identity
from the Assad government67. With the Assad regime using brutal tactics, such as the use of
chemical weapons, bombings, and the targeting of civilians, ISIS has been able to gain many
recruits because most of the communities the Assad government targets are Sunni because
they support of the rebellion. A woman, whose name is kept anonymous for her protection,
who is a former member of ISIS explains how conditions in Syria led to her joining ISIS
saying, “Everything around us was chaos. Free Syrian Army, the regime, barrel bombs,
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strikes, the wounded, clinics, blood -- you want to tear yourself away, to find something to
run to. My problem was I ran away to something uglier"68. By the Assad government
attacking Sunnis, ISIS was able to gain many members because many Sunnis believed
joining ISIS as fulfilling a jihad because their faith and the people of their faith are in danger
due to the Syrian government’s targeting of civilians, especially Sunni Muslims.
ISIS has also been able to recruit thousands of members to join in Iraq because of
the religious divide within the country. In Iraq, Sunni Muslims are a minority making up
42% of Muslims, while the majority of other Muslims in Iraq are Shia69. Before the fall of
Saddam Hussein, the Sunni’s held more political power, but once the U.S. invaded Iraq and
formed a new government there, a predominantly Shiite government took over and has left
much of the Sunni population feeling disenfranchised especially with many of the Iraqi
government’s policies and actions which have marginalized the Sunnis. The change of
power in Iraq has created an abundance of potential recruits for ISIS because of the
sectarian divide between Sunni and Shiites because ISIS can convince many Sunnis that
already feel disenfranchised that in order to gain equality, it is necessary to join ISIS and
wage jihad against the Iraqi government. Thahir Sahab Jamel, a former ISIS member, states
how he joined ISIS to fight the mostly Shia Iraqi government saying, “A man named Salam
talked to me and got me connected to ISIS. He told me I needed to be a jihadist and fight the
Shia government. He convinced me to fight the government. I started getting involved as
they were planning operations to begin in Iraq and Syria”70. Many Sunni Muslims view the
Shia government as illegitimate as it has led to the disfranchisement of the Sunni
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population. ISIS has been able to recruit many members by capitalizing on this view
towards the Iraqi government.
In an email written by a Sunni Muslim women living in Iraq, she writes about her
observation as to why many young Sunni Muslim men have joined ISIS due to the violent
experiences Sunni communities have endured because of their treatment as second-class
citizens by the Shia government and U.S. and ally airstrikes in Sunni communities:
“The bombardment was carried out by the government. The air strikes
focused on wholly on civilian neighborhoods. Maybe they wanted to target
two ISIS bases. But neither round of bombardment found its target. One target
is a house connected to a church where ISIS men live. It is next to the
neighborhood generator and about 200-300 meters from our home. The
bombing hurt civilians only and demolished the generator. Now we don’t have
any electricity since yesterday night. I am writing from a mobile device in my
sister’s house, which is empty. The government bombardment did not hit any
of the ISIS men. I have just heard from a relative who visited us to check on us
after that terrible night. He says that because of this bombardment,
youngsters are joining ISIS in tens if not hundreds because this increase
hatred towards the government, which doesn’t care about us as Sunnis being
killed and targeted. Government forces went to Amerli, a Shia village
surrounded by tens of Sunni villages, though Amerli was never taken by ISIS.
The government militias attacked the surrounding Sunni villages, killing
hundreds, with help from the American air strikes”71.
Due to ISIS members identifying as Sunni Muslims in Iraq, they have taken control
and operate out of mostly Sunni communities. However, this makes it much more difficult
politically for the U.S. and Iraq because the unintentional killing of civilian Sunni Muslims
not affiliated with ISIS can cause individuals within these targeted communities to be
pushed towards joining ISIS because they feel as though their communities, families,
religious identity, and they themselves are under attack. Also, the lack of protection
provided by the Iraqi government had led to further tensions. Iraqi militias and the
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governments military have on numerous occasions given security priority to Shia
communities over Sunni communities in combating ISIS, and in the eyes of many Sunnis
shows the government’s unequal treatment of the two different Muslim sects.
A study conducted by Quantum Communications interviewed 49 ISIS members who
either were detained or defected from the group in Iraq and Syria, to see what their
motivations were for joining the terrorist organization. This study compiled the 49
subject’s motivational reasons, the most common having to do with defending Sunnis.
Many of the other reasons they described also had to do with defending Sunnis such as the
waging a jihad and the war in Syria. It is their opinion that they are launching a holy war in
order to create a better government and life for Sunnis72.

The number of people among 49 current and former members of extremist groups in Iraq and Syria
influenced by each factor in joining the fight (George LeVines / Defense One. Data: Quantum
Communications)73
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The research and the graph above from Quantum Communications shows how
sectarian issues in both Iraq and Syria have led to increased recruitment for ISIS. With
Sunni disfranchisement occurring in both countries, many Sunnis have joined ISIS because
they believe it will create a state where they are no longer inferior to other religious groups
and can take control their own governments. ISIS’s successful recruitment in both
countries is also quite similar to the IRA’s successful recruitment in Northern Ireland
during the Troubles. The Sunni disfranchisement in both states is much like Catholic
disfranchisement in Northern Ireland during the 1970s and 1980s that caused many Irish
Catholics to join the IRA to change the social and political status quo. The sectarian divide
helped the IRA recruit for decades and with sectarian issues existing for years in both Syria
and Iraq with no sign of a solution in either state, ISIS can capitalize on this turmoil and
continue to recruit disenfranchised Sunni’s helping to ensuring ISIS’s survival.
Social Media
Today’s terrorist groups also have a new strategic element for recruiting new
members, unavailable to previous terrorist groups, and that is social media. Social media is
not unique to only some of today’s religious terrorists groups because they all share a
special relationship with it. Social media has been beneficial for existing terrorist groups
because it is a cheap, effective, and low risk method of recruiting. Social media has helped
various religious terrorist groups because social media has allowed terrorist groups to
reach larger audiences, target young audiences, and use new methods of propaganda
making their recruiting more effective.
Social media allows terrorist groups to recruit members globally instead of solely
relying on possible recruits from within their local population. Recruiters for today’s
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terrorist groups can simply log into any social media site, find and meet people online who
they believe are prone to being radicalized and entice them to join their group. Facebook is
the most popular form of social media with around 1.8 billion users logging on at least once
a month74. The popularity of Facebook gives terrorist groups access to such a large pool of
people that it becomes much easier to find potential new members. Geoff Dean explains
how religious terrorist groups utilize social media, specifically Facebook, to recruit
members:
“The most important and useful Facebook feature for terrorist organization
is the ‘groups’ function. The apparent strategy used by terrorist
organizations is to create a Facebook groups based on a seemingly innocent
ideal, such as supporting Palestinians or Islam in general. As member
numbers of the group increase, jihadist material can be slowly introduced by
the members of the organization to the Facebook group in a way which does
which does not directly condone or encourage jihadist actions, and thus does
not constitute a violation of Facebook policy. From this position, the group
can even be directed straight to the websites and forums of the terrorist
organization behind the Facebook group.”75
Members of ISIS and al Qaeda can utilize Facebook by drawing in people by creating
a group that looks appealing to many users throughout the site. Groups terrorists create on
Facebook will more than likely have no direct reference to the group or terrorist actions,
but will be about topics that may relate to the group’s ideology or certain political
positions. The description of the groups that terrorists create aim to target individuals who
may be more likely to be radicalized, so recruiters develop Facebook groups which would
be more likely to target these individuals. For example, ISIS recruiters may create a
Facebook group that supports more Sunni political representation in IRAQ, or a group that
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supports Palestine against Israeli military actions relying on the religiosity of each conflict.
If ISIS were to create a group that was about something that did not remotely relate to their
group’s cause, such as a Red Sox fan club, they would fail to attract those who may be
interested in fighting for ISIS, and instead attract Red Sox fans who would only relate to
fighting with Yankee fans. Once the recruiters gain a decent amount of member, recruiters
start posting content about jihad and see what response members give. Those who appear
to be more enthusiastic about the content will likely be contacted further because they are
much more likely to be radicalized and join the terrorist organization. Religious terrorist
groups have benefited greatly from social media platforms such as Facebook because it
allows them to recruit new members through the Internet who might live all across the. An
ISIS or al Qaeda member may sign onto Facebook in the Middle East and recruit an
individual living in Europe or North America. The 22,000 foreign fighters in Syria in Iraq
who joined ISIS from 100 different countries show how effective social media has been for
recruitment for today’s religious terrorist groups because it was able to increase ISIS
membership by reaching out to recruits thousands of miles away76.
Social media as a tool of recruitment may also lead to ISIS, al Qaeda and other
groups being viable for a greater length of time because of the age group social media
caters to the most. A survey conducted by the Pew Research Center found that those under
30 years old were much more likely to use social media and be more active on social media
than those older than 5077. With the majority of social media users being under 30,
religious terrorist groups are benefit greatly from social because it gives ISIS and al Qaeda
the ability to attain new members necessary for the group’s survival past one generation.
76
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Many terrorist organizations fail to inspire younger generations to join and continue the
group’s cause. They fade away and cease to exist as members age and die. However, social
media gives existing religious terrorist groups more of an advantage in surviving because
they can inspire younger people through its various channels.
Social media has also made sharing videos to wide audiences much easier, and in
many cases, today’s religious terrorist organizations have used videos on social media to
encourage viewers to join their cause. Similar to the IRA, much of ISIS and al- Qaeda’s
propaganda is created in reaction to political or military events and is aimed at inspiring
people to join. Visuals have been known to cause more impressions on people than just
text. For example, in the U.S. during the Vietnam War, much of the violence was captured
on film and anti-war sentiment was spurred because of the public’s realization of the
carnage in warfare. Al Qaeda and ISIS have both used video for propaganda and
recruitment purposes, however, ISIS is much better known for their videos. In many of
ISIS’s videos, they capture combat footage and show images and videos of their group’s
successes such as their video showing bulldozer’s destroying the Syrian Iraqi border. They
also use videos to recruit new members. For example, in a video entitles, “There is No Life
Without Jihad”, two western ISIS members are addressing Muslims and claiming they
should join ISIS by saying things like “the cure for depression is Jihad” and “you can be here
in the golden time or you can be on the sideline for which you will have to answer on
judgment day”78. With social media platforms such as YouTube, these messages can be
spread worldwide and be viewed by thousands of people quickly. Because of the effects
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imagery has on people and current religious groups ability to broadcast their videos
through social media, they can effectively and rather simply upload videos inspiring people
to join their terrorist organization.
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Counterterrorism
Background
Terrorist organizations can cease to exist for a variety of reasons. Terrorist groups
can be dismantled by a state or states, a group could lack the financial resources needed to
operate, and in rare instances, a group can also succeed and lose its need to continue to
operate. There are many more possibilities as to why terrorist groups ceases to exist,
however, religious terrorism seems unique in that is has many qualities that may lead to
groups transcending normal difficulties previous groups have had to face in order to
survive. Accepting that religious terrorist groups such as ISIS and al Qaeda have a much
higher probability of surviving for longer than different forms of terrorist groups due to
their religiosity and other present day factors, what are some ways in which states can
effectively employ counterterrorism measures against today’s leading international
terrorist groups? And what counterterrorism measures should states avoid?

End The U.S. War on Terrorism
U.S. military counterintelligence strategies used thus far to combat today’s religious
terrorist organizations, have caused a wide range of issues for the United States. U.S.
military action must be used more effectively in order to bring an end to al Qaeda and ISIS.
By saying effectively, I do not suggest increasing the military’s role in countering terrorism
by increased bombing of suspected terrorists, more military spending, or deploying more
troops abroad to combat terrorists. On the contrary, in order to effectively bring an end to
today’s religious terrorist organizations, I believe it is necessary for the United States and
other western countries to restrict their use of the military to combat terrorism, and allow
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for nonmilitary measures to play a larger role. The use of military force by the United States
and other Western countries has failed for many reasons, but this is not uncommon
because only 7% of the time states rely on the military to end a terrorist campaign are they
successful. Military use for counterterrorism can also have an adverse effect and lead to
terrorist organizations gaining more members. The military’s role in counterterrorism
must be reduced and a greater focus placed on more preventative measures that block
terrorist organizations from launching attacks and gaining territory in order to protect
potential victims therefore discrediting the legitimacy of the organization.
After 9/11, al Qaeda succeeded in gaining more support for their cause because of
the United States use of military force and its invasion of both Afghanistan and Iraq. The
United States invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq was done as a part of the U.S. War on
Terrorism, which vaguely declared that the United States would fight until all terrorist
groups wishing to attack the United States and its allies were eliminated. In 2001, after the
9/11 attacks, Congress passed a bill, the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
Terrorists (AUMF) which gave the President the power “to engage those ‘nations,
organizations, and persons’ responsible for the 2001 attacks both as a means of retaliation
and to allow preventive action”79. The deployment of U.S. troops to combat al Qaeda in the
War on Terror and the passing of the AUMF in 2001 would be the beginning of the United
States’ militarization of counterterrorism, which still exists today.
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Before the 9/11 attack occurred, bin Laden had made videotapes and explained to
reporters that he wanted to draw a U.S. military presence into the Middle East in order to
combat U.S. troops stationed there80. One major reason why al Qaeda wanted this was
because they believed it would spur widespread recruitment because much of Islamic
world had already viewed the United States as an aggressive country and as an enemy to
Islam. Osama bin Laden’s bodyguard alluded to this idea before the 9/11 attacks and is
quoted as saying, “ We are working for a big operation: namely, dragging the United States
into a confrontation with the entire Islamic world”81. By deploying hundreds of thousands
of troops to Afghanistan, and shortly after Iraq, the United States provided proof for the al
Qaeda organization to spread to its audience, most importantly potential recruits, that the
United States was waging war against Islam and that a defensive jihad was necessary to
defend Islam. Bruce Hoffman writes about the effect that the United States foreign policy
actions had on countries with large Muslim populations in the aftermath 9/11 and their
views towards bin Laden:
“Bin Laden’s astonishingly popularity among the populations of such key
American allies in the war on terrorism as Pakistan (where in 2004 he was
viewed favorably by 65 percent of those polled), in Jordan (55 percent), and
in Morocco (45%) attests to the intense antipathy felt toward the United
States in North Africa, the Middle East, and South and South East Asia, as well
as in other regions with large Muslim populations. This perception of Islam
under attack by an incontestably predatory, aggressive U.S dominated West
is of course eagerly exploited and expertly manipulated by bin Laden and his
minions”82.
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The United States War on Terrorism may have been unsuccessful for a variety of
reasons, but it is hard ignore one reason in particular and that is it gave al Qaeda the
propaganda and thus the ability to recruit thousands of new members to fight against the
U.S. The United States military may have successfully diminished al Qaeda’s strength,
influence, and operational capabilities, but despite that the group still exists and launches
attacks today because it was able to recruit new members over the past 16 years.
After President Bush’s two terms, his successor, President Obama, declared an end
to the War on Terrorism, however, he still utilized many of the same military tactics
President Bush had use to combat terrorism. During President Obama’s presidency, he
shifted counterterrorism policy slightly from President Bush’s by pulling back military use
and placing more importance on preventing terrorist groups from attracting new members.
However, despite President Obama including more non-military actions to battle terrorism,
the U.S. military still played a major role in counterterrorism during his presidency. While
Obama was President, he kept U.S. troops in Afghanistan and increased military spending
such as “U.S Special Operations Command from $9bn in 2010 to $9.8bn in 2011-and
assistance to foreign militaries, raised from $350m in 2010 to $400m in 2011” 83. Despite
President Obama claiming to end to the War on Terrorism, he still used the military under
the AUMF to combat terrorism, which may as well have been a continuation of the War on
Terror84. Despite the Obama administration not ending the War on Terrorism due to the
President’s use of the AUMF, he did reduce military involvement. United States
counterterrorism policy makers should continue to deescalate the military’s role to combat
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terrorism and focus on preventing the radicalization of people who continue to join al
Qaeda and ISIS.
That does not mean that the United States should completely abandon military use
in counterterrorism. Geraint Hughes writes about how western states should shape their
counterterrorism policies and use military force:
“Physical elimination or incarceration of terrorists is a secondary task to
wider nonmilitary measures to reduce the appeal of terrorism, notably the
need to work with foreign governments, civil society groups and NGOs to
address socioeconomic and political problems which may radicalize potential
recruits for al-Qaeda. It is also advisable following the Iraq debacle to keep
direct military intervention by Western states to an absolute
minimum…specific military measures can be applied if they are related to a
wider process of political engagement with regional powers, and also aspects
of soft power such as public diplomacy”85.
One successful use of the military against terrorist organizations is its ability to
launch preemptive intervention strikes against a terrorist organization before it launches
an attack. During the 1990s in Ireland, the British military adopted a strategy of prevention
and focused its resources and men on preventing the IRA from launching attacks. This
proved to be successful in not only preventing the attack but because it had a demoralizing
effect on the IRA. These preventative strikes by the British against IRA members who were
about to commit a terrorist attack were successful because they not only made the IRA
unable to launch attacks but ultimately led to the killing or capture of many members. The
inability of the IRA to attack led to frustration within the group and resulted in failing
recruitment and lack of propaganda so the population of Irish Republicans turned to
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“nonviolent methods to pursue their goals” as violence became more apparently
unsuccessful to them86.
Since 9/11, military force has been the focus of U.S. counterterrorism policies. The
U.S. has held the belief that the most successful way to combat modern terrorists is to go
overseas and root out terrorists and kill them in order to deplete the group’s membership
and deter others from joining evidenced by President Bush stating, “Those who make war
with the United States have chosen their own destruction”87. In President Bush’s statement
he declares that any person who joins a terrorist group, such as al Qaeda, will be destroyed
in order to deter members and with the military using aggressive means to kill as many
terrorists as possible, this should be a sign to any person thinking of joining al Qaeda.
Deterrence through military means has been unsuccessful but despite that, this method has
been continuing for over a decade and has been very costly for the U.S, and as mentioned
above, has also spurred further membership for terrorist groups. What the U.S should do is
vastly reduce its military action in its counterterrorism efforts and focus more on
nonviolent practices that aim to prevent recruitment. Due to the differences in al Qaeda
and ISIS, I propose two separate approaches that the military should take to combat them.
The U.S. military should focus on preventing al Qaeda from launching attacks against the
West and stop ISIS from gaining new territory.
Al Qaeda cannot be fought militarily because “al Qaeda is ineradicable because it can
survive, cockroach-like, by going underground”88, which makes it difficult for conventional
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militaries to target al Qaeda members and bases. Due to the United States inability to use
the military to eradicate al Qaeda, the U.S should focus on preventing al Qaeda from
launching attacks against the U.S. The U.S is the primary enemy to al Qaeda due to many
Muslims disliking U.S foreign policy in the Middle East, so any military action the U.S takes
to combat al Qaeda can be characterized as not just an attack on al Qaeda but as an attack
on Islam. However, if al Qaeda was unable launch attacks many of its recruits may be
persuaded to resort to different tactics to achieve their political aspirations. Geraint Hughes
writes, “military and police operations can be integrated as part of an overall policy of
containing and, if necessary, neutralizing hard-core terrorists who wish to fight to the
bitter end, while impressing those amenable to compromise that negotiations offer a more
viable means of achieving objectives than the continuation of violence”89. If the U.S.
restricted al Qaeda’s ability to attack, many members or recruits may view al Qaeda as
unable to succeed in causing any change, and they may turn to more political strategies of
recruiting which is very similar to the British forces thwarting IRA attacks during the
1990’s. John M. Venhaus writes about how the U.S should take a two-step approach with
nonviolent and military counterterrorism measures writing:
“Since defeating al-Qaeda does not involve fighting in a particular physical
place, the central tenet of the radicalization prevention strategy is to
discredit the brand image and dissuade those who seek membership or
affiliation. Physical confrontation should continue, because discrediting the
brand requires that al-Qaeda operations be continuously and publicly
destroyed, dismantled, and disrupted with an active combination of military
and law enforcement actions. Concurrently, a parallel effort should plant
doubts about the viability and effectiveness of al-Qaeda operations in the
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minds of those who seek to join al-Qaeda or establish an associated
movement”90.
In order to do this, the U.S. should take a more domestic approach in preventing al
Qaeda from launching attacks and only resort to launching military attacks in the Middle
East if it is in order to prevent an attack from occurring because by doing so it will discredit
al Qaeda and diminish al Qaeda’s recruitment capabilities.
ISIS’s goal is to establish a caliphate, and if it were unable to grab more land and
especially if it started to lose land that it controlled, it would lose a lot of its credibility and
inflict a blow to the organization’s ability to recruit new members to continue to fight to
establish a caliphate. The U.S. could use more conventional military tactics against ISIS
because it functions more as a state than a terrorist group as does al Qaeda. However, a U.S.
“invasion would be a huge propaganda victory for jihadists worldwide”91. If the U.S.
invaded, ISIS could rally many recruits to join because the U.S. is launching a War on Islam
much like al Qaeda did during the U.S invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. With ISIS more
focused on regional struggles, it launches fewer attacks against western countries so U.S.
counterterrorism strategy against ISIS should be focused on supporting ISIS’s enemies.
Supporting the Kurds with supplies, training, money, intelligence, and air support would be
in the U.S. best interest militarily because “they can keep the Islamic State from fulfilling its
duty to expand. And with every month that it fails to expand, it resembles less the
conquering state of the Prophet Muhammad than yet another Middle Eastern government
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failing to bring prosperity to its people”92. The U.S. should use military action against al
Qaeda only to support the enemies of ISIS in order to delegitimize the group’s goal of
developing a caliphate because ISIS success thus far in controlling territory has led to
members pouring in from all over the world.
U.S. counterterrorism strategy should not define U.S. military action as the sole
method in combating terrorism, because as time has proven it is ineffective and in many
cases has negative consequences for the state. Counterterrorism policies should focus more
on nonviolent methods that disrupt terrorist recruitment, and only use military force to
prevent attacks in order to save lives and destroy the group’s credibility and thus
recruitment ability. The aim in counterterrorism should not be founded on the idea to
eliminate these groups by force because militaries only have about a 7% percent success
rate in ending terrorist organizations93. The U.S. should repeal the AUMF because it is only
a continuation of the War on Terror,94 and instead implement counterterrorism military
policies that aim to discredit the terrorist group. By preventing al Qaeda from launching
attacks against the West, and ISIS from grabbing more territory, they appear illegitimate to
their potential recruits because they will seem to be weak organizations unable to achieve
their aspirations. The U.S. should then focus on nonviolent strategies, which aim to prevent
al Qaeda and ISIS from gaining more members, which I will describe later in this chapter.
The idea of demilitarization in counterterrorism is very similar to the British
counterterrorism approach towards the IRA during the 1990’s, which promoted more Irish
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Catholic political involvement in Northern Ireland and the use of the military to prevent
IRA attacks from occurring, both of which made joining the IRA much less appealing.

Nonviolent Counterterrorism
Government Suppression an Issue
One way in which states can combat today’s religious terrorist groups is for states to
support many of the governmental and political changes occurring in the Middle East.
Throughout the Middle East there has been a major push by younger generations wanting
more democratic institutions like free elections, freedom of the press, equality, and more
democratic governments, which is very damaging to groups like al Qaeda and ISIS. “When
dictators reigned supreme in Arab lands, al-Qaeda could score points by emphasizing the
struggle against despotism… When dictators such as Mubarak fall, however, al-Qaeda loses
one of its best recruiting pitches: the repression of Arab governments inflict on their
citizens”95. ISIS and al Qaeda have been able to take advantage of political turmoil
throughout the Middle East and add thousands of members to their ranks because of their
political disfranchisement. As previously referenced, Sunnis in Syria have been at odds with
the Assad regime and joining ISIS has been a popular way for many Sunnis in Syria to fight
back. Many Sunnis join because they feel that living under the rule of a caliph is a much
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better option than under the harsh Syrian government, which, routinely represses,
economically disfranchises, and kills innocent Sunnis. Sunnis in Iraq have also joined both
al Qaeda and ISIS for similar reasons, despite the Iraqi government not being as repressive
towards them as the Assad regime in Syria. As Sunnis in Iraq have experienced a power
shift since the end of Saddam Hussein’s reign, with power transferring from them to the
Shia majority, they have felt and have experienced political disfranchisement.
Much like today’s religious terrorists groups, one can also see the same issue
operating in Northern Ireland during the late 1900s, which sparked the Troubles and
further IRA recruitment. One of the main reasons the IRA lasted so long as a terrorist
organization is because so many Irish Catholics felt neglected by Irish Protestants and
England, that they saw no other way to gain equality but to resist by the use of force. For
good reason, Sunnis in Iraq and Syria, as well as Irish Catholics in the 1900’s, felt repressed
by their governments. Both al Qaeda and ISIS have vowed that they will fight democracies
as hard as they fight dictatorships, however, this may not be possible because with
democracy the idea of fighting a democratic government may be much less inviting to the
Arab world96. With more democratic governments and policies in states such as Syria and
Iraq that promote equality, fewer individuals would be inclined to pick up arms and fight
for a terrorist groups because political and social issues that they currently face will more
likely be resolved creating fewer reasons as to why a person would join a terrorist group.
If the United States, other western countries, and countries in the Middle East
strengthened their engagement with Sunni Muslims in Iraq and Syria, they could possibly
help prevent and reverse the current disfranchisement in both Sunni communities. If many
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of the grievances that Sunni Muslims have in both states were heard and addressed it
would decrease the sectarian divide that currently exists in both states, inflicting a massive
blow to much of al Qaeda’s and ISIS’S recruitment. Propaganda made by both al Qaeda and
ISIS that is aimed to recruit Sunni Muslims by drawing on sectarian issues would be less
effective because the issues Sunni Muslims faced in both countries may be effectively
diminished with a more democratic government and policies that develop equality for
them as well.

Preventing Homegrown Terrorists
Western states such as the U.S. can also develop more political and social policies to
prevent individuals from becoming radicalized within their own states. A European study
of individuals who have committed a terrorist attack in Europe, found that long-term
citizens of the state that felt alienated and discriminated in their society were much more
likely to commit a terrorist attack97. In the U.S., along with many other Western countries,
Muslims have been treated as second-class citizens; many being immigrants and others
being treated poorly even after having lived in the country for 2 or 3 generations. They do
not achieve economically because they do not have the same opportunities as their
counterparts in society. Individuals can be much more susceptible to radicalization because
of the division between them and the society that they live in. Some become inspired to join
these groups or carryout a lone wolf attack in the name of the group.
In order to combat this, states should adopt policies preventing discrimination
against Muslims and other minorities, and create programs that help those that lack many
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of the opportunities available to the majority of society, such as education and healthcare.
In Europe especially, many states have already passed legislation aimed at protecting
human rights, which may be infringed upon during counterterrorism measures, in order to
prevent alienating Muslims in society and also create programs in order to assist poor
Muslim communities. The United States has failed to adopt many of these same tactics,
which has only helped fuel the radicalization of many individuals. The European Counter
Terrorism Coordinator, Gijs de Vries states:
“To win the battle for hearts and mind our policies to combat terrorism must
respect the rights and value we have pledged to defend including the rights
of prisoners. Abu Grahib, Guantanamo and CIA renditions have damaged
America’s standing in the world and have compromised our common
struggle against terrorism. Credibility matters. The European Union
continues to believe that in this battle we should be guided by established
international legal standards, including international human rights law”98.
If the United States were to adopt many of these tactics to prevent discrimination
such as wrongful imprisonment, torture, and restrictions on religious freedoms, it could
strike a significant blow to ISIS and al Qaeda’s recruiting and the danger states face from
citizens within their own population becoming a members of either terrorist organization
or any other for that matter. One step that the U.S. could take in order to start to prevent
the discrimination of Muslims is by closing Guantanamo Bay. The harsh prison conditions
and the wrongful imprisonment of many Muslims in Guantanamo Bay has been used as a
recruiting tool for al Qaeda and ISIS. They use this to enforce the idea that the U.S. is an
oppressive government toward all Muslims. By shutting down the prison the United States
could take the first step towards building policies that prevent the discrimination of
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Muslims. More must be done after that in order to defend Muslim individuals equal rights.
After the shutdown of Guantanamo Bay, the U.S. should look to develop laws to protect the
Muslim population within the country, as have many European countries. If Muslims have
the same rights as other non-Muslims, then they would not feel as discriminated against by
the U.S. government. Muslims in the U.S would unlikely be as receptive to ISIS or al Qaeda’s
message that the U.S is waging a war on Islam if they were treated as any other citizen by
the United States and had the same rights as any other American citizen.
Another issue that must be dealt in Western countries, especially in the U.S, is the
treatment of Muslims by Western societies. The way in which Western societies treat and
talk about Muslims is a systemic issue that has led to the radicalization of many Muslims. If
Western societies continue to use language that discriminates against Muslims or Islam,
they may cause Muslims to become alienated and more likely to join a terrorist
organization. It is important that Western societies change their language when referring
to Islam and Muslims especially when referring to terrorism because as of now there is a
lot of anti-Muslim sentiment throughout Western populations. In the United States many
prominent figures have painted Islam as a religion of hate and intolerance, and that the
religion of Islam is directly responsible for why Islamic terrorist groups exist. For example,
many Christian religious leaders are very influential because they have such large
followings and in many cases have spread their intolerant views about Islam to the
American public. An anonymous CIA officer wrote examples of what many American
religious leaders were saying about Islam writing:
“Pat Robertson says, ‘Adolf Hitler is bad, but what the Muslims do to Jews is
worse; the Reverend Jerry Falwell refers to the Prophet as a ‘terrorist’; Jimmy
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Swaggart prays that ‘God blesses those who bless Israel and damn those that
damn it”; and the Reverend Franklin Graham calls Islam a ‘wicked religion’”99
The American government cannot change society’s beliefs, treatment, or sentiments
concerning Islam or Muslims which makes it much more difficult to solve this issue. Also,
given that many individuals who carry intolerant views towards Islam have platforms that
allow them to spread their beliefs to thousands or even millions of Americans, makes it
even more difficult to reverse anti-Islamic sentiment. The U.S. government cannot silence
these individuals or those that hold intolerant views towards Muslims, but it can attempt to
try and shape American public opinion away from anti-Islamic rhetoric. If American society
is to become more tolerant of Muslims, prominent figures must begin speak about Islam
using different language as not to demonize the entire religion and its followers. A clear
distinction must be made between the very small percentage of Muslims that use Islam as a
reasoning to wage a terrorist campaign, and the overwhelming majority of peaceful
Muslims. If U.S. society were to become more accepting of Muslims, then Muslim
individuals would feel less alienated and thus unlikely to join a terrorist organization. The
ability to change anti Islamic views of American society may be extremely difficult and also
impossible because no piece of legislation can shape American perception making this a
very difficult issue to fix. However a campaign should be launched in order to shape
American minds in order to prevent Muslims from becoming radicalized because they feel
as though they do not belong in American society and begin to view the U.S and the West as
their adversary.
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Countering Social Media
ISIS and al Qaeda have been able to rely on social media for recruitment because it
has provided them an outlet to spread their brand to attract new members. The use of
social media has been very advantageous to both groups and other modern terrorist
groups not just because of the recruitment capabilities it provides, but also because no
state has found a way that effectively prevents recruitment through social media. Social
media is a new phenomenon in human history and has opened up a new frontier in
terrorism that counterterrorism institutions are unable to deal with and as of now.
Before social media, terrorist organizations were dependent on the mainstream
media to reach potential recruits, and would do so by launching attacks because the
media’s coverage of their attack would provide the organization a platform for them to
promote their organization. The dependence on the mainstream media restricted the
ability of older terrorist groups to recruit because if a media outlet chose to cover other
current events, their message would go unheard. Social media has made this a non issue
though by cutting out the media as a necessary middle man because now terrorists can
directly communicate with a large audience through social media and promote their
brand100. ISIS and al Qaeda can spread their propaganda, ideology, and narratives of their
attacks through social media to a broader audience and gain recruits because of the
freedom social media gives them to do so, and thus far no state has developed a truly
successful method to combat today’s terrorist organizations online101.
Why it’s Difficult
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One reason the U.S. or any other state has been unable to stop terrorist’s use of
social media is because of states’ governments inabilities to control the Internet as a whole.
Gabrielle Wiemann writes about how terrorist recruitment and activities are suited for the
Internet writing,” … it is de-centralized, it cannot be subject to control or restriction, it is
not censored, and it allows access to anyone who wants it”102. Weimann’s description
makes it seem as though the Internet is under no governmental control, which is not true.
However, it does describe how many governments allow for the Internet to remain largely
independent from the government’s control, which gives terrorist groups the opportunity
to operate in a more de-centralized space. The Internet creates a safe space because it
allows terrorists to communicate more anonymously and out of reach of state
authorities103. In countries that have more Internet censorship, such as North Korea, these
safe spaces will be much less likely to exist, but countries such as the United States and
other Western nations which allow more freedom on the internet due to less censorship
allow for opportunities for terrorists to operate online without state interference. It may
seem simple to just say the U.S. government should resort to more censorship of the
Internet to prevent terrorist’s recruitment, but if the U.S. government were to do so it
would restrict the freedom Americans have concerning the Internet. For example, due to
ISIS and al Qaeda using popular social media websites such as Facebook and Twitter to
communicate, the U.S. government would have to censor both websites to prevent terrorist
communication and would result in all Americans losing access to then as well. The same
would go for any website which the U.S. government believes terrorists use to recruit
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online. Censorship of the Internet to prevent terrorists groups from communicating
through social media would be successful in preventing terrorist groups from recruiting,
but it would be costly because American citizens would lose freedom on the Internet and
would be a violation of the First Amendment. Censorship is not a dependable strategy
because legally the U.S government cannot do it and because of the effect censorship would
have on the American people.
The inability to censor the Internet allows terrorist groups to use social media
platforms and have a larger audience, but why can’t the U.S. control social media sites and
restrict terrorist’s group’s use on social media? The U.S. and other state governments
cannot control social media sites because of the high of volume of use by terrorists. The U.S.
can’t simply delete, block, and remove terrorists groups on social media sites because the
shut down of all terrorists organizations on social media would be an impossible task
because of the sheer amount of social media accounts and websites that already exist, and
the fact that terrorist groups can promptly create new accounts and websites if one is
deleted104. Due to the lack of control of the Internet, is had become impossible for the U.S.
or other governments to stop terrorists from using social media to recruit because it would
entail violating the right of others to freely use the internet and its impossible to regulate
social media accounts and prevent the access from specifically terrorist groups.
Current Methods
Due to the inability for state governments to control the social media use of
terrorists, the U.S. State Department has become more active throughout social media itself
in order to combat terrorist online recruiting. The Center for Strategic Counterterrorism
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Communications (CSCC) has created a Facebook account, three Twitter accounts, and a
YouTube account in Arabic only in order spread messages that counter terrorist social
media groups, such as those created by ISIS and al Qaeda, in order to prevent the
radicalization of individuals105. Many of the groups created by the Digital Outreach
Program have thousands of followers, but many followers may be those who already
shared the same views the group promotes, or be researchers studying the activity of the
group so many actual followers may not be the targeted audience. The unknown reasoning
as to why people are following the groups makes “The counter-messaging strategy difficult
to evaluate, as metrics of views and followers do not equate to proof that people are
deterred from being extremists”106. Counter-messaging by states can also use material
posted on the social media sites of terrorists and use it as a propaganda tool against them
as James Farwell describes, “ISIS fighters may take pride in tweeting and bragging about
their experiences, but such material provides fodder for the group’s opponents, who can
use it to discredit the militants’ narrative while mobilizing opposition”107. The extremely
violent images can be used as propaganda to discredit and convince possible recruits that
joining the terrorist group is not in their best interest. However, there is also proof that
these violent images may be popular among many and that reposting these pictures may
even help the terrorist group that originally posted it. Kathleen Bouzis writes about the
effects a violent video posted by the Digital Outreach Program:
“To a troubled, youthful, predominantly male audience this message might
elevate ISIL in their eyes as a force that dominates its enemies and shows no
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mercy toward its adversaries and therefore this video could be
counterproductive and might function as pro-ISIL propaganda”108.
Due to social media being so new and its quick implementation by terrorist groups
for recruitment and other purposes, states’ counterterrorism measures have not been an
adequate solution to stop them from recruiting members online. States are limited in their
ability to prevent terrorist groups from using social media because they cannot use
censorship as it would be costly for their own citizens, and as of now there is no proven
method that successfully deters recruits from becoming radicalized and joining terrorist
groups like al Qaeda and ISIS. The U.S. is actively using counter-messaging to deter terrorist
membership, but it is not known if it has had an impact. The U.S. should continue to
develop the Digital Outreach Program and find a way to determine if it is having a positive
outcome.
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Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to explain how existing, religiously inspired terrorist
groups are more likely to have greater longevity than secular terrorist groups because of
their different recruitment methods. Certain terrorist groups have unique recruitment
strategies due to their religiosity, which helps them appeal to more people and inspire
more individuals to join their organizations. In this paper, I have written case studies about
three terrorist groups, the IRA, al Qaeda, and ISIS, and have highlighted the key themes that
have contributed to each groups’ successful recruitment of new members, and how their
continued recruitment is possible leading to each group extending their longevity.
Religious terrorist groups are different than secular terrorist organizations because
they can recruit new members by using religious ideology. Religious terrorist groups, as
with all other terrorist groups, are formed to cause a political change, but religious terrorist
groups can tie their political and religious ideologies together and in doing so use a variety
of new methods to gain members. Religious terrorist groups can use sectarian issues
revolving around religion to gain members, utilize religious symbols that are meant to
certify the group’s ideology and draw in recruits, and describe their causes as divine and
moral because they can project their enemy as being adversarial toward not only the
group, but anyone who follows the same religion. Religion has proved to play a crucial
motivating role for recruits, and terrorist groups have taken advantage of this. With
religious terrorist groups’ combination of political and religious aspirations, they can
attract more recruits because people are drawn in for greater reasons than they would be
in terms of secular groups. The number of religious terrorist groups and total number of
individuals involved in these groups are expected to decrease around the year 2025
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because, historically, previous terrorist groups have been popular for approximately one
generation because they cannot support recruitment cross generationally109. Due to
current religious terrorist groups new recruitment abilities they seem able to survive for
much longer because religion adds a host of advantages regarding recruiting.
Given that religious terrorist groups may survive for much longer than other
terrorist groups, it is important for states to develop counterterrorism policies focused on
damaging the recruitment abilities of terrorist organizations. A key factor to combat
today’s terrorist organizations is that counterterrorism policy makers in the United States
should not expect the War on Terror to end abruptly, but change the military’s role in
counterterrorism. The U.S. militarization of counterterrorism since the declaration of the
War on Terror in 2001, has had no success for a variety of reasons. Most conventional
military forces cannot effectively combat terrorists. The United States use of physical force
cannot force terrorist groups into submission, and because the U.S. regards itself at war
with terrorist organizations, it leads to the narrowing of counterterrorism policies and only
focuses on the military aspect of combating terrorism110. States should not rely solely on
military means for counterterrorism because they are ineffective for the most part. They do
not prevent terrorist organizations from continuing to recruit and can often lead to
terrorist organizations gaining even more support and recruits because a state’s
militarized counterterrorism strategy may being characterized by terrorist groups as
aggressive, unnecessary, and as targeting the religious identity the group claims to have. If
the U.S. would repeal the AUMF, it would be a major step in the demilitarization of

109
110

Rapoport, The Four, [Page 48].
McIntosh, "Counterterrorism as War," [Page 26].

77
counterterrorism and would allow for new counterterrorism methods outside of the
military to operate likely causing more significant damage to the recruitment of today’s
religious terrorist organizations, and in doing so, shorten the longevity of each
organization.
Going forward it will be interesting to see what approach President Trump takes
toward religious terrorists groups. President Trump has not been in office long enough to
determine exactly what type of counterterrorism methods he will employ against al Qaeda,
ISIS and other terrorist organizations. Despite the lack of clarity surrounding the Trump
administration’s policies towards counterterrorism, there can inferences made based on
the limited actions he has taken thus far in office, and by the policies he suggested
implementing throughout his campaign. It seems as though President Trump is more
concerned with preventing terrorist attacks from being launched within the United States
than directly combatting terrorism overseas. This is similar to the approach taken by
President Obama.
President Trump has taken a more domestic counterterrorism approach because of
his idea that ISIS and al Qaeda will send their members directly to the U.S. in order to
launch a coordinated attack. His solution to prevent these terrorist groups from launching
terrorist attacks in the United States is to change the United States’ immigration policies
concerning people travelling to the U.S. from countries that are predominantly Muslim.
During a speech in August 2017, during the presidential campaign, President Trump gave a
speech about fighting terrorism and stated, “Pew polling shows that in many of the
countries from which we draw large numbers of immigrants, extreme views about religion
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– such as the death penalty for those who leave the faith – are commonplace”111. President
Trump’s belief that extremist groups are sending members to immigrate to America has
resulted in him signing two executive orders preventing citizens and refugees from several
Muslim majority countries from coming to the U.S. Judges have blocked both of these
executive orders because they were ruled to be unconstitutional. Despite both executive
orders not going into action, the Trump administration still seems focused on preventing
domestic attacks from occurring, but nonetheless, these travel bans and other immigration
policies that are aimed to prevent or make it much more difficult for terrorists to enter the
United States may cause more issues as more Muslims may feel more alienated in the U.S.
Also, his policies could deepen resentment toward the U.S. in the Middle East, only helping
ISIS, al Qaeda, or other religious terrorists groups to recruit more members.
Trump has also taken a similar approach to Obama with counterterrorism activity in
the Middle East. Trump claims to have been in opposition of the Iraq war and has promised
to abandon the idea of nation building. President Trump, like President Obama, wants to
refrain from establishing large-scale U.S. personnel operations in the Middle East to fight
terrorism and thus far has been relying on the AUMF to launch drone strikes, bombings,
and the use of special operation units to fight ISIS and al Qaeda. President Trump has also
called to rely more on NATO and other regional allies in the Middle East to prevent the
spread of these religious terrorist groups112. The continuation of President Obama’s
counterterrorism measures in the Middle East is a better solution than escalating the
military force, but it will still remain unsuccessful in preventing ISIS and al Qaeda from
recruiting more members.
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Given President Trump’s actions thus far, and the counterterrorism policies he laid
out during his campaign, do not seem suitable to effectively bring an end to either terrorist
organization. Yet it is still very early in Trump’s presidency and many things can change
regarding counterterrorism and the policies he and his administration make to fight al
Qaeda and ISIS. If the Trump administration is to be successful in bringing an end to both
groups, the U.S. should repeal the AUMF and resort to more nonviolent tactics. Nonviolent
methods such as implementing diplomatic measures to develop equality of Sunni Muslims
in Syria and Iraq, counter messaging Al Qaeda and ISIS’s religious claims, and the
promoting the Muslim minority populations in Western countries to prevent them from
being radicalized would all deal a significant blow to ISIS and al Qaeda and make it much
more difficult for them to survive. If the U.S. enacted counterterrorism policies such as
these and abandoned older counterterrorism models, recruitment would be increasingly
difficult and lead to the downfall of many religious terrorist groups because without
enough membership terrorist groups cannot survive and will cease to exist.
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